As of January 2025, the Japanese government debt is estimated to be approximately 8.84 trillion US dollars (1.35 quadrillion yen), or 263% of GDP,[1] and is one of the highest among developed nations.
[6] Japan's asset price bubble collapse in 1991 led to a prolonged period of economic stagnation described as the 'Lost Decades', with GDP falling significantly in real terms through the 1990s.
In 2012, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Yearbook editorial stated that Japan's "debt rose above 200% of GDP partly as a consequence of triple disaster and the related reconstruction efforts.
[22] Betting against Japanese government bonds has become known as the "widowmaker trade" due to their price resilience even if fundamental analysis indicates the contrary should be true.
[23] The cost of importing energy in the wake of Fukushima disaster in 2011 has also negatively impacted Japan's longstanding current account surplus.
Later, it was thought that this was the root cause of postwar inflation, and Japanese government enacted the Public Finance Act of Japan in response.
There was the phase that opportunity to act austerity policy rose when the fear for return (repayment) principal of interest was close-upped at any trouble happened.
There was the opinion that suggested a fear for general situation of the economic structure, that the Japanese economy experienced deflation caused by globalization and the growing international competition.
With the above-mentioned view point from the mobilizing of finances by the government or the action to monetary squeeze by the BOJ, or, from the view point that it has been deflation recession caused by long termed low demand, there are criticisms that it also cause an effect hurt power of economy the tend to promote structural reform [jp] increase efficiency of supply side.
These regulations result from realization that the Bank of Japan brought about violent inflation by their public bond purchases during the period from before to just after the Pacific War.