[1] It appears unlikely that any poll did take place; a pro-League faction of the electorate published public letters in local newspapers expressing support for Jogezai and soon enough, he had secured a super-majority of over forty signatures against a paltry ten by Achakzai.
[1][c] Activists sympathetic to Baloch ethno-nationalist causes claim that Jogezai, having failed to win the confidence of the electorate in multiple discussions on the accession, had the final voting preponed by a day to eliminate dissenters.
[1] Martin Axmann, a German scholar specialising in colonial Balochistan, agrees that no meaningful voting did take place but finds it impossible to sieve out further truth from these competing claims — which failed to agree even on the basics like the strength of the electorate or the date of accession — in light of a lack of archival sources; however, he notes that the accession had popular support and would have succeeded irrespective of Jogezai's alleged stratagems.
Records show that he took part in a division of the house only once voting against an amendment that sought to prevent the state from suspending fundamental rights on grounds of "internal discontent"; he did not table any amendment and would deliver his solitary speech on 13 October 1953, a year before the eventual dissolution of the Assembly, criticizing the denial of political reforms in Balochistan as an insult to Jinnah's (and the League's) assurances before and during the accession.
[f] In September 1958, the Government of Pakistan chose Jogezai as its envoy to pacify the Khanate of Kalat who — in collaboration with Achakzai, Abdul Ghaffar Khan, and others — rejected the One Unit Scheme and demanded the restoration of his erstwhile territories as a single state; the parley failed and martial law was imposed the next month after, leading to the Jhalwan Disturbances.