North-West Mounted Police during the North-West Rebellion

The NWMP suffered early reverses and, although they supported the relief force sent to the region under the command of Major-General Frederick Middleton, their performance was heavily criticized.

[3] As tensions rose, Commissioner Acheson Irvine responded to messages from detachments in the area and mobilized the spare manpower at NWMP headquarters at Regina.

[9] The two sides first clashed when Crozier, with 55 NWMP and 43 civilian volunteers, attempting to seize a cache of supplies in the area, confronted a larger force of rebels at Duck Lake on 26 March.

Rather than evacuating his NWMP unit and the settlers from Prince Albert, Irvine instead began to use the town as a citadel for area residents fleeing the threat of attack.

[20] Militia units numbering more than 5,000 strong, commanded by Major-General Frederick Middleton, hurried west along the Canadian Pacific Railway.

[22] The second and third columns, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel W. Otter and Major-General Thomas Strange, were accompanied by 74 and 20 NWMP men respectively, the latter group armed with a 9-pounder field gun.

[23] Otter's men reached Battleford on 1 May 1885 and marched south to Cut Knife Creek where they expected to find Poundmaker, with the NWMP forming the advance guard.

The force then pursued Big Bear and the remnants of the rebellious Cree, along the way fighting a battle near Frenchman's Butte, until they were captured or surrendered.

[30] (Judge Charles Rouleau found Louison Mongrain guilty of the killing of Constable Cowan and sentenced him to death by hanging.

He had seen the troops sent to Green Lake to search for him but had eluded them, then had made his way to Fort Carlton, where upon discovery he give himself up voluntarily to NWMP Sergeant Smart.

[35] General Middleton criticized Irvine and the NWMP for having remained in Prince Albert throughout the campaign and for failing to join his forces during the Battle of Batoche.

[40] Early historians defended the performance of the NWMP, noting that the force was mostly under the command of the militia and General Middleton himself, and were not given opportunities to show their value in battle.

R. C. Macleod, for example, noted that Irvine's failure to reinforce Middleton "can only be explained by excessive caution...or by his ignorance of what was happening on his doorstep".

[42] Stanley Horrall blamed the police's poor performance on a combination of government neglect and weak leadership shown by Commissioner Irvine in the years running up to the rebellion.