Although opposition to Federation was at first limited to a relatively small group of educated Africans, the imposition of agricultural rules designed to reduce soil erosion, which took significant amounts of land out of cultivation and involved additional work by the smallholders affected, made it more widely unpopular.

[3][4] After a short initial period of rioting, damage to property and strikes after the Emergency was declared, most of the strikers returned to work and Nyasaland became calm but tense, apart from remote areas in the Northern Region, where resistance continued for several months.

However, Armitage had no plans to resolve the political crisis in Nyasaland, other than expecting that the elimination of Banda and Congress would allow alternative politicians willing to cooperate with the colonial government to emerge.

[11] Africans living on these estates were required to pay rent, normally satisfied by their undertaking agricultural work for the owner under the system known as thangata, which later developed into a form of sharecropping in some areas.

Schemes to prevent cutting down and burning trees to assist the cultivation of finger millet, and to restrict the numbers of cattle owned, had begun in that region in 1938, but from 1947 they were increasingly enforced through fines.

[37] In the nine months between his return and the declaration of a State of Emergency, Banda combined opposition to the Federation with more popular causes, such as the African smallholders' dislike of agricultural practices imposed on them to promote soil conservation and also the remnants of thangata.

Banda's strategy was to use these popular issues to mobilise Congress supporters into strikes, demonstrations, disobedience and non-violent protests that would disrupt the everyday operation of the colonial government.

[38] Up to late October 1958, the leadership of Congress did not promote or endorse violent action by its members and was in constitutional discussions with the Nyasaland government that gave some promise of African political advancement.

However, when the new Head of Police Special Branch arrived in Nyasaland in September 1958, one of his first tasks was to update a list, originally prepared in June, of those to be arrested if a State of Emergency were declared.

When the constitutional talks ended in apparent stalemate early in January 1959, Henry Chipembere and Kanyama Chiume led to demands within Congress for an escalation of anti-government protests and a more aggressive campaign of disobedience.

[50] However, by mid-February, action by Congress supporters became more violent and statements by its leading activists were increasingly inflammatory so the governor's choices were to carry on with the visit by Lord Perth in the hope that the discussions would help to lower the political temperature, or declare a State of Emergency.

Armitage, nervous of loss of control, wanted to "nip trouble in the bud" there by detaining leading members of EOKA, and he later did so under a Detention of Persons Law without any formal State of Emergency.

The Commissioner of Police reported to the Governor on 18 February [62] that: "The Nyasaland African Congress has prepared plans for the mass murder throughout the Protectorate of all foreigners, by which is meant all Europeans and Asians, men, women and children, to take place in the event of Dr Banda being killed, arrested or abducted.

His assessment was that there was no evidence that Congress had started to act on the more extreme plans reported and that, until 20 February, Banda was still hopeful that a proposed meeting with Lord Perth, the Minister of State for Colonial Affairs would lead to useful constitutional discussions.

[83] On 3 March 1959 Armitage, as governor of Nyasaland, declared a State of Emergency over the whole of the protectorate and arrested Dr. Hastings Banda, its president and other members of its executive committee, as well as over a hundred local party officials.

[93] Initially, Lennox-Boyd was doubtful about the political consequences of introducing such legislation and, hoping that the Devlin Commission would recommend the continuance od detention without trial, deferred a decision pending its report.

As the Nyasaland government was concerned that a small number of detainees would resume violent activities and intimidation, legislation was introduced in May 1960 to extend the detention of several named individuals: all these were released by 27 September.

He subsequently told the Devlin Commission that he had been advised of the "murder plot" and, although Brock thought it was only a wild idea,[101] his actions on 3 March were directed at protecting local European residents in Nkhata Bay.

The Southern Rhodesian government relied on the strength of the paramilitary British South Africa Police, backed by European conscripts in the Royal Rhodesia Regiment, to quell any disturbances.

[103] Although the initial reaction of many Congress supporters was rioting, damage to government and European property and strikes, within a few days action by the police and troops ensured that the Southern Region became calm but tense and the strikers returned to work.

[104] By October 1958, there were 48 Congress branches in the Northern Region, whose members were the nucleus for a campaign of sabotage that began in that poorly-policed area in mid-February 1959 when constitutional talks broke down and continued until August 1959 when its leader was captured.

[105] This continued resistance was countered by what the governor described as a campaign of harassment, a series of punitive operations undertaken by soldiers rather than police in what were considered "disaffected" areas, mostly in the north of the protectorate.

Suspected members of Congress were arrested and temporarily detained, subject to the governor later ordering long-term detention, or together with other Africans, were charged with criminal offences, either under the emergency regulations or normal laws: a total of 1,040 persons were convicted by the courts and 840 acquitted up to the end of October 1959, when this campaign in the north ceased.

In addition, collective fines were imposed on some of these areas under the emergency regulations and, during the operations, homes and property were destroyed and large numbers of Africans were physically abused.

It rejected claims of rape and torture made against Federation troops during Operation Crewcut, but it upheld complaints of the frequent burning of houses, the imposition of arbitrary fines and bullying behaviour, including beatings with rifle butts or fists, all of which it considered to be illegal and excessive.

[124] The Attorney-General Sir Reginald Manningham-Buller attacked the Repart's use of the expression "police state" and its rejection of talk about a coherent murder plot: he also claimed that any illegal force used was a regrettable operational necessity[125][126] The Commissioners felt let down by this reaction, but one anticipated that the Report would soon be vindicated, as it was within a year after Iain Macleod replaced Lennox-Boyd in October 1959.

Accordingly, and despite opposition from Armitage, from the governments of the Federation and Southern Rhodesia, and from some colleagues in the cabinet, Macleod released Banda from detention on 1 April 1960 and immediately began to negotiate with him on Nyasaland's constitutional future.

[136] Even before Macleod's appointment, Lord Perth and Colonial Office officials expressed doubts in October 1959 about Armitage's belief that sufficient moderates could be found to supplant Congress or in his ability to negotiate with Banda, assuming the latter were released.

However, the press coverage highlighted to the British public and parliament the strength of African opposition to the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland and the degree of coercion needed to preserve it, and further discredited Armitage.

[150] McCracken also suggests that Baker's underlying aim was to "set the record straight" by restoring the reputation of Nyasaland's colonial officials of the 1950s and 1960s, while attacking African nationalists and their sympathisers.