In his December 1737 letter to his friend and relative Henry Home, Lord Kames,[6] Hume set out his reasons for omitting the sections on miracles in the earlier Treatise.
He added that he had considered publishing the argument against miracles—as well as other anti-theistic arguments—as part of the Treatise, but decided against it so as to not offend the religious sensibilities of readers.
[7] Hume starts by telling the reader that he believes that he has "discovered an argument ... which, if just, will, with the wise and learned, be an everlasting check to all kinds of superstitious delusion".
"[9] Laws of nature, however, are established by "a firm and unalterable experience";[10] they rest upon the exceptionless testimony of countless people in different places and times.
It is no miracle that a man, seemingly in good health, should die on a sudden: because such a kind of death, though more unusual than any other, has yet been frequently observed to happen.
Gaskin has pointed out,[16] other definitions of miracles make them fall under the order of nature, and then they would be subject to Hume's critique of the Teleological Argument.
Fogelin [19] and Vanderburgh [20] show in detail how Earman and other critics have made serious errors in interpreting Hume's account of miracles and his treatment of evidential probability.