One China

The term may refer, in alphabetical order, to one of the following: After the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) defeated the Kuomintang (KMT) in the Chinese Civil War and the subsequent retreat of the ROC to Taiwan, the CCP established the PRC in mainland China while the ROC ruled over Taiwan and several outlying islands.

Under ROC President Lee Teng-hui in the 1990s, the Additional Articles of the Constitution of the Republic of China were passed which effectively transformed Taiwan from a one-party state into a democracy, and limited civil and political rights to citizens in the "free area" (the area under its de facto control, consisting of the island groups of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, Matsu and some minor islands), but did not alter language regarding territorial claims or national territory.

[27][28] The Dutch colony was later conquered by Zheng Chenggong (Koxinga), a Ming-loyalist, in 1662 as the Kingdom of Tungning, before being incorporated by the Qing dynasty in 1683 as part of Fujian Province.

While Taiwan remained under Japanese control, the Qing dynasty was ousted and the First and Second Republic of China (ROC) were established from the Beiyang regime to the Kuomintang (KMT) from 1928.

[29][30][31][32][33][34] In 1949, after losing control of most of mainland China following the Chinese Civil War, and before the post-war peace treaties had come into effect, the ROC government under the KMT withdrew to Taiwan, and Chiang Kai-shek declared martial law.

From April 30, 1991, the ROC officially recognized the PRC thus abandoning the Hallstein Doctrine, while maintaining the claim of an exclusive mandate as the legitimate ruler of China.

[43] The ROC transformed into a free and democratic state in the 1990s following decades of martial law with the passage of the Additional Articles of the Constitution of the Republic of China.

Under former President Lee Teng-hui, additional articles were appended to the ROC constitution in 1991 so that it applied effectively only to the Taiwan Area.

The United Front, which consists of the eight other political parties in the PRC subordinate to the CCP, has adhered to the One-China policy and opposes Taiwan independence.

Former DPP president Chen Shui-bian believes the 1992 Consensus forsakes Taiwan's national sovereignty, effectively ceding it to the PRC.

Not formally recognizing the ROC is a requirement for any political entity to establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China, in effect forcing other governments to choose between Beijing and Taipei.

However, many nations are unwilling to make this particular statement and there was often a protracted effort to find language acceptable to both sides, for example that they "respect", "acknowledge", "understand", or "take note of" the PRC's One China principle (but do not say they "recognize" it).

agree that U.S. One-China policy was not intended to please the PRC government, but as a way for Washington to conduct international relations in the region, which Beijing fails to state.

A more recent study suggests that this wording reflected the Nixon administration's desire to shift responsibility for resolving the dispute to the "people most directly involved" – that is, China and Taiwan.

At the same time, the United States would avoid "prejudic[ing] the ultimate outcome" by refusing to explicitly support the claims of one side or the other.

[72] On 2 December 2016, US President-elect Donald Trump and ROC President Tsai Ing-wen conducted a short phone call regarding "the close economic, political and security ties between Taiwan and the US".

[77] On May 23, 2022, U.S. President Joe Biden announced the United States would intervene militarily if China were to unilaterally invade Taiwan.

As with the past leaderships, the Russian government has accepted its support for the One-China policy that Taiwan is "an inalienable part of China, and opposes any forms of independence."

[88][89] Lito Banayo, chair of the Manila Economic and Cultural Office in Taiwan remarked that the country's One China Policy only proscribes the Philippines to enter into political and military agreements with the ROC.

[55]: 22 The People's Republic of China demands Taiwan acknowledge the One-China principle as a prerequisite to resume any cross-strait dialogue.

However, the One-China principle would apparently require that Taiwan formally give up any possibility of Taiwanese independence, and would preclude any "one nation, two states" formula similar to ones used in German Ostpolitik or in Korean reunification.

[citation needed] KMT officials visited mainland China, and the Chinese ARATS met in Beijing with its Taiwanese counterpart, the Straits Exchange Foundation.

This is a significant point in the history of Cross-Strait relations in that a president of the ROC no longer claims administrative authority over mainland China.

Chen, after assuming the Democratic Progressive Party chairmanship in July 2002, moved to a somewhat less ambiguous policy, and stated in early August 2002 that "it is clear that both sides of the straits are separate countries".

This statement was strongly criticized by opposition Pan-Blue Coalition parties on Taiwan, which support a One-China principle, but oppose defining this "One China" as the PRC.

Chen Shui-bian abandoned his earlier ambiguity and publicly rejected the One-China principle claiming it would imply that Taiwan is part of the PRC.

At the end of the 2004 election, Lien Chan and his running mate, James Soong, later announced that they would not put ultimate unification as the goal for their cross-strait policy and would not exclude the possibility of an independent Taiwan in the future.

In March 2005, the PRC passed an Anti-Secession Law which authorized the use of force to prevent a "serious incident" that breaks the One-China policy, but which at the same time did not identify one China with the People's Republic and offered to pursue political solutions.

Although President Chen at one point supported the trips of Lien and Soong for defusing cross-strait tensions,[94] he also attacked them for working with the "enemy" PRC[citation needed].

[95] On 28 May 2008, Kuomintang Chairman Wu Po-hsiung made a landmark visit to Beijing,[96] and met and shook hands with the Communist General Secretary Hu Jintao, at the Great Hall of the People.