The withdrawal to the chord of the Bapaume and Noyon salients provided 13 to 14 extra divisions for the German strategic reserve, that was being assembled to defend the Aisne front against the Franco-British Nivelle Offensive, preparations for which were barely concealed.
[1] An offensive was considered as an alternative, if enough reserves could be assembled in the New Year and a staff study suggested that seventeen divisions might be made available but that this was far too few to have decisive effect in the west.
The Germans planned to waste the land; villages demolished, bridges blown, roads and railways dug up, wells tainted and the population carried off.
The commander of the XIV Reserve Corps, Generalleutnant Georg Fuchs, reported that morale was low and that the defences were in a deplorable state, positions near the Ancre being nothing more than flooded shell holes.
Hermann von Kuhl, chief of staff of Army Group Rupprecht of Bavaria (Heeresgruppe Kronprinz Rupprecht) was persuaded by Fuchs and others to advocate a move back to the Siegfriedstellung and on 4 February, the Kaiser, Wilhelm II ordered that the intervening ground be devastated and the retirement to begin on 9 February; Below and the 2nd Army commander, General der Kavallerie Georg von der Marwitz (since 17 December 1916), had been overruled by a consensus of their leaders and subordinates.
Rupprecht also opposed the intention to turn the ground in the Noyon Salient into a wasteland when the final demolitions to scorch the earth began on 16 March, because of the damage to the prestige of the German Empire and the deleterious effects on the discipline of his troops.
[6] The demolitions made a desert of 580 sq mi (1,500 km2) of territory and Rupprecht contemplated resignation, then relented, for fear that it might suggest a rift between Bavaria and the rest of Germany.
Railways and roads were dug up, trees were felled, water wells were polluted, towns and villages were demolished and many land mines and other booby traps were planted.
About 125,000 able-bodied French civilians in the region were transported to work elsewhere in occupied France, while children, mothers and the elderly were left behind with minimal rations.
The withdrawal took place from 16 to 20 March, with a retirement of about 25 mi (40 km), giving up more French territory than that gained by the Allies from September 1914 until the beginning of the operation.
[16] In 2004, James Beach wrote that some authorities hold that British aerial reconnaissance failed to detect the construction of the Hindenburg Line or the German preparations for the troop withdrawal.
Frequent bad flying weather over the winter and the precedent of new German defences being built behind existing fortifications during the Somme battle, led British military intelligence to misinterpret the information.