It formed part of Operation Bodyguard, a broad strategic deception designed to disguise the imminent Allied invasion of Normandy.

Graffham's aim was to convince German intelligence that the Allies were actively building political ties with Sweden in preparation for an upcoming invasion of Norway.

During the war, Sweden maintained a neutral stance, and it was hoped that if the government were convinced of an imminent Allied invasion of Norway, that would filter through to German intelligence.

One of the key elements of Bodyguard was Operation Fortitude North, which promoted a fictional threat against Norway via wireless traffic and visual deception.

Fortitude North played on German, and particularly Adolf Hitler's, belief that Norway was a key objective for the Allies (although they had earlier considered and rejected the option).

As a result, John Bevan, head of the London Controlling Section (LCS) and charged with overall organisation of Bodyguard, was concerned that visual/wireless deception would not be enough to create a believable threat.

By increasing this pressure with additional, false requests, Bevan hoped to further convince the Germans that Sweden was preparing to join the Allied nations.

[3] On 3 February 1944, the LCS proposed a plan "to induce the enemy to believe that we are enlisting the help of Sweden in connection with the British and Russian contemplated operations against northern Norway in the Spring of this year.

On 25 March, Wulf Schmidt, a double agent with the code name Tate, transmitted a message to his handlers explaining that Mallet was in the country to receive instructions and would be returning to Sweden for "important negotiations".

However, privately Boheman indicated that Sweden's air force would not pursue Allied planes in their airspace, and also that limitations of the transport collaboration meant it would have little benefit for the British.

Thornton spent two weeks in Sweden, meeting with the head of the Royal Swedish Air Force, General Bengt Nordenskiöld.

German documents captured after the war showed that although they did not believe Norway to be the main invasion target, the Fortitude North units were considered capable of a diversionary attack.