The LCS had little guidance in strategic deception, an activity pioneered by Dudley Clarke the previous year, and was unaware of the extensive double agent system controlled by MI5.

Despite its limited impact, the operation gave the LCS experience in planning deceptions, and laid the groundwork for future exploitation of Hitler's belief that Northern Europe was strategically important.

[1] They recommended that a "controlling section" be set up to oversee strategic deception planning, which would then be put into practice at the operational level by the armed services.

[2] Stanley had great difficulty in convincing the Allied military establishment, which was sceptical of strategic deception and resistant to the idea of a central planning authority, to take part in an operation.

As a result, the objective for Hardboiled was chosen because the resources existed and it would not affect real future operations (planners had already rejected Norway as a viable target), rather than for any strategic advantage it brought the Allies.

[5] Stanley also lacked knowledge of the extensive double agent network under the control of the Twenty Committee, having merely been told that MI5 had an avenue through which to pass information to the enemy.

Allied commanders decided these were implausible targets because of their northern location and an amphibious landing at Stavanger was chosen, based on planning for Operation Dynamite (a previously considered, and rejected, invasion of the country).

[6] LCS member Dennis Wheatley had picked it from a book of codewords, and explained to Stanley (who was unaware) that the name had been randomly selected so as to bear no relation to the operation's aims.

[7] Michael Howard, who wrote the official British history of strategic deception, attributes the lacklustre response to severe setbacks the Allies were then facing on every front, and writes that it is difficult to imagine the Germans believing that a major offensive operation was being planned.

[8] The operation did not give the Allies any tactical or strategic advantage; Howard notes that it provided experience for the planners in handling deception and for the Twenty Committee in proving the worth of double agents.

Dudley Clarke had already shown that the most effective method of deception involved the use of agents and faked wireless traffic, rather than major training and troop movements.