1942 1943 1944 1945 Associated articles 1941 1942 1943 1944 1942 1943 1944 1945 Operation Mascot was an unsuccessful British carrier air raid conducted against the German battleship Tirpitz at her anchorage in Kaafjord, Norway, on 17 July 1944.

German radar stations detected these aircraft while they were en route to Kaafjord, and Tirpitz was protected by a smoke screen by the time the strike force arrived.

Operating from fjords on the Norwegian coast, the battleship was capable of overwhelming the close-escort forces assigned to the Arctic convoys or breaking out into the North Atlantic.

On 6 March 1942, torpedo bombers flying from the aircraft carrier HMS Victorious attacked the battleship while she was attempting to intercept Convoy PQ 12 but did not achieve any hits.

[4] On 23 September 1943, two British X-class midget submarines penetrated defences around the battleship at her main anchorage at Kaafjord in northern Norway during Operation Source, and placed explosive charges in the water beneath her.

[6] As Tirpitz was still considered a major threat to Allied shipping, the British military sought to damage or destroy the battleship before she could re-enter service.

[9] Following several months of preparations the Home Fleet's first attack on Kaafjord, which was designated Operation Tungsten, was conducted on 3 April 1944 and involved five aircraft carriers.

The two strike forces of 20 Fairey Barracuda dive bombers escorted by 40 fighters were not detected during their flights to Kaafjord, and the battleship was hit by 15 bombs.

The commander of Nazi Germany's Kriegsmarine, Grand Admiral Karl Dönitz, placed a priority on returning the battleship to service so that she could continue to tie down Allied naval resources.

He and other senior German officers recognised at this time that the threat of further air attacks meant that Tirpitz could no longer operate against Allied convoys.

First Sea Lord Andrew Cunningham did not believe that Barracudas could carry weapons capable of sinking Tirpitz, but he hoped that further attacks would increase the period the battleship was out of service and harm her crew's morale.

[12][13] The commander of the Home Fleet, Vice Admiral Bruce Fraser, initially resisted this order on the grounds that further carrier raids on Kaafjord were unlikely to be successful as Tirpitz's defences would have been reinforced and weather conditions were likely to be worse than those encountered during Operation Tungsten.

The fleet reached the position where its aircraft were to be flown off three days later, but the raid was cancelled when Allied agents near Kaafjord reported bad weather over the target area.

[13][16] A strike force of 27 Barracudas escorted by Vought F4U Corsair and Supermarine Seafire fighters took off from the carriers HMS Furious and Victorious on the afternoon of 15 May, but encountered heavy cloud over Kaafjord and returned without attacking.

[19] Despite the lack of success, the Admiralty and Admiral Sir Henry Moore, who had assumed command of the Home Fleet on 14 June 1944, remained committed to attempting further carrier raids against Tirpitz.

[20] During June, the Admiralty received a series of intelligence reports indicating that repairs to Tirpitz were generally progressing well and the battleship would soon be ready to put to sea.

Late that month Allied spies spotted Tirpitz conducting steaming trials in Kaafjord, and reported that she was capable of sailing at up to 20 knots (37 km/h) and could rotate her main gun turrets.

Work on repairing the battleship began in late April, and 157 shipyard workers and special equipment were transported from Kiel in Germany to Kaafjord to accelerate the project.

[24] As Victorious had been redeployed to the Indian Ocean in June, the carriers selected for Operation Mascot were the recently commissioned HMS Indefatigable as well as the veterans Formidable and Furious.

[29] The improved defences in place by the time of Operation Mascot included a cliff-top observation post near Kaafjord, which was capable of directing the battleship's anti-aircraft guns if necessary.

[22] The German Luftwaffe (air force) had few fighters stationed at bases near Kaafjord, and their operations were constrained by a lack of fuel.

In accordance with these instructions, the flying squadrons assigned to the three carriers undertook training exercises from their ships and shore bases from 4 July onwards.

During the voyage north, the airmen received detailed briefings on the attack plans and terrain around Kaafjord and were also issued with escape kits to use if they were shot down over Norway.

[41] While Kaafjord was under attack, the commander of the German submarines in the Norwegian sea ordered Group Trutz to take up new positions to the south-east of Jan Mayen and intercept the British ships as they returned to Scapa Flow.

The submarine's anti-aircraft guns damaged the Catalina, killing the navigator and wounding Cruickshank as well as three other crewmen, but the pilot continued his attack and sank U-347 with depth charges.

Accordingly, Group Trutz was ordered to sail north, and four more submarines sortied from Narvik to guard the approaches to Alten and Vest fjords.

[45] Following the attack on 17 July, the British learned from intercepted German radio transmissions and reports provided by Secret Intelligence Service agents that Tirpitz had not suffered any significant damage.

[33] Admiral Moore blamed the failure of Operation Mascot on the inexperience of the aircrew involved in the attack, and criticised the strike leader for not selecting alternative targets after it became clear that Tirpitz could not be accurately bombed.

Consideration was also given to flying fast and long-ranged de Havilland Mosquito bombers off the carriers in an attempt to achieve surprise, but none of these land-based aircraft could be spared from supporting the Allied bombing of Germany.