On the day before the operation, an Israeli police boat was deliberately sent close to the Syrian shore, in order to provoke a response.

Moshe Sharett, who was in the United States attempting to acquire weapons, had told Gurion that any attacks could negatively affect these talks.

The complex operation involved a two-column attack from the north and south, which included both infantry and armored vehicles, as well as an amphibious assault conducted by troops who crossed the sea by boats of Shayetet 11.

It drew a United Nations rebuke[16] and it resulted in the postponement of Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett's arms request (the US government had decided to approve it on the eve of the attack, but retracted when the news came out).

Sharett also expressed suspicion to Abba Eban that Ben-Gurion had deliberately ordered the raid to deny him a personal victory in the arms request.

In January 1956 the Security Council passed a resolution threatening Israel with sanctions in the event of further breeches of the armistice agreements.

[17][12] Upon his return home, Sharett berated Ben-Gurion's military secretary when the latter greeted him at the airport, accusing him of betrayal.

In Israel, Sharett continued to sharply criticize Ben-Gurion for ordering the raid, once remarking that "Satan himself could not have chosen a worse timing."

One minister charged that the IDF was pursuing an independent policy and trying to impose its will on the government, while others speculated that it had exceeded the orders it had been given while expanding the operation's scope.

Indeed, it has been suggested that Syria's failure to act militarily on behalf of its Egyptian ally during the Israel invasion of Sinai was a consequence of Operation Olive Leaves.

[13] Second, Israel's capture of numerous Syrian soldiers during the raid helped facilitate the release of its four captives held by Syria.