However, the Allied advance was unexpectedly slow, against heavy German resistance, especially in the Hürtgen Forest through which the main thrust of the offensive was carried out.

By mid-December, the Allies finally reached the Rur and tried to capture its important dams, when the Germans launched their own offensive, dubbed Wacht am Rhein.

After the Allied breakout from Normandy, the German Wehrmacht was involved in a string of disastrous battles in July and August, most notably the Falaise pocket.

The long term target after the Rur was crossed was to reach the Rhine and establish bridgeheads at Krefeld and Düsseldorf to secure further advances inside Germany after the winter.

At the same time, the RAF Bomber Command was to hit the traffic centres of Jülich and Düren hard; the smaller towns of Heinsberg, Erkelenz and Hückelhoven were designated as secondary targets.

The ground offensive was to begin immediately after the air raids, allowing the defenders no time to reestablish fortifications, supply routes and communications.

For the successful execution of the plan, the holding of the Rur River line was deemed as absolutely important, to prevent the Allies from a flanking attack.

The German plan for the November–December Campaign was, therefore, to hold the Rur River line with a minimum of available forces until the Ardennes Offensive could be launched.

That would cause large scale destruction and destroy Allied bridges over the Rur, isolating all troops east of the river.

The Allies did not fully recognize the strategic importance of the dams for some time, and only days before the end of the offensive they made their first specific moves towards them.

Although manpower losses were enormous, the Wehrmacht sought to compensate for this with transferring of men from the Reserve Army, the Luftwaffe and the Kriegsmarine into frontline troops for rebuilding their forces.

German communications after the bombing were heavily impaired, and there was a considerable effect on morale, especially of units consisting of younger and more inexperienced troops.

Casualties were heavy, especially after reinforced counterattacks on Hamich and nearby Hill 232 by the 47th VGD and still-present mobile reserves from the 116th Panzer Division.

CCA was assigned to assist the 104th Division, while CCB would act independently to take four villages (Werth, Koettenich, Scherpenseel, and Hastenrath) in the northwestern fringes of the Hürtgen Forest, defended by the 12th VGD.

The German tactic was to fight mainly in the thick woods, where American artillery and aerial support was ineffective and a state of bloody trench warfare emerged.

Meanwhile, GFM Rundstedt decided to inject some reinforcements into the battle, but only if two divisions were simultaneously pulled out from the front for the Ardennes Offensive preparations.

The logistical difficulties and the inexperience of the new opponent aided 1st Division and it was finally able to push out of the forest, taking Langerwehe, Jüngersdorf and Merode by 28 November.

Intense fighting raged on for hours; on 5 December the town was finally secured, and Collins ordered a pause due to the slow advance of the other divisions of the corps.

This task was passed to the 4th Infantry Division, which was positioned at VII Corps southern wing to take a route between Hürtgen and Schevenhütte, also capturing the villages of Kleinhau and Grosshau.

The thinned out German lines could not offer as much resistance as in early November, but the difficult terrain, as well as the mines, caused heavy casualties to the Americans.

The 116th Panzer Division, which had helped to mount several counterattacks during the early fighting, was withdrawn on 21 November from the area to be refitted for the upcoming Ardennes Offensive.

4th Division reached Grosshau on 25 November, but could not capture it due to heavy resistance and coordination problems with the supporting armored units.

With assistance from the 2nd Armored Division, on 18 November its drive was renewed against the opposing German 246th VGD, taking Setterich, Bettendorf and the surroundings of Siersdorf.

By 28 November, XIX Corps had reached the Rur on a broad front with only two German bridgeheads on the western side of the river remaining, which were not taken until 9 December.

[34] While Ninth Army's advance was successful, at the beginning of December VII Corps had just left the Hürtgen Forest, was still short of the Rur and had taken heavy casualties.

It had to advance through the towns of Strass and Gey, the latter had just been the location of a heavy battle which had practically rendered 4th Division unavailable for further offensive operations.

The dams were a strategically important target, as they would allow the Germans to flood the Rur valley and everything else downstream of it as far as the Meuse and into the Netherlands.

On 13 December V Corps, already at the Rur, was tasked to start an offensive to seize the dams from various directions including the Ardennes sector.

Even without knowing of the upcoming German offensive, Allied planners estimated the earliest date for a large thrust into Germany for mid-January.

The successful holding of the Rur River line would only lead to a lengthened war, causing additional destruction and loss of life.