The trial judge found that Ice's conduct satisfied these criteria and ordered that his sentences for the two burglaries and the two sexual assaults, in which he touched the girl's vagina, to be served consecutively.

The system at issue in Oregon here is that judges are limited in their discretion because they must find certain facts before ordering sentences to run consecutively.

Recent legislative enactments are meant to mitigate the harshness of the historical rule, but that does not mean that a defendant is entitled to his sentences running concurrently.

Scalia criticized the majority opinion as being contrary to Apprendi v. New Jersey, United States v. Booker, and Blakely v. Washington, in which the court had held that any fact (other than a previous conviction) must be admitted by the defendant or proved beyond a reasonable doubt before a jury.

Neither the reasoning of the Apprendi line of cases, nor any distinctive history of the factfinding necessary to imposition of consecutive sentences, nor (of course) logic supports such an odd rule.

The Court here limited the application of a rule laid down in Apprendi v. New Jersey and extended in Blakely v. Washington and Cunningham v. California, requiring juries to find the existence of certain facts before increasing the length of a defendant's prison sentence beyond the statutory maximum.