The decision would ultimately lead to the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Ottoman citizens, the Armenian genocide, the dissolution of the empire, and the abolition of the Islamic Caliphate.
Multipolarity had traditionally afforded the Ottomans the ability to play off one power against the others, which occurred a number of times with consummate skill, according to the author Michael Reynolds.
The pro-CUP Tanin went so far as to suggest that Vienna's motive in carrying out this act was to strike a blow against the constitutional regime and provoke a reaction in order to bring about its fall.
[b] The [Ottoman delegate] replied that Empire was the Japan of the Near East (alluding to Meiji Restoration period which spanned from 1868 to 1912), and that we already had the Cyprus Convention which was still in force.
That was intolerable for St. Petersburg, and Russia developed a plan for invading and occupying the Black Sea port of Trabzon or the eastern Anatolian town of Bayezid in retaliation.
[23] During the July Crisis over the murder of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in 1914, German diplomats offered the Ottomans an anti-Russian alliance and territorial gains in Caucasia, north-western Iran and Trans-Caspia.
As the crisis deepened in Europe, the Ottomans had a policy to obtain a guarantee of territorial integrity and potential advantages and were unaware that the British might enter a European war.
[24] On 30 July 1914, two days after the outbreak of the war in Europe, the Ottoman leaders agreed to form a secret Ottoman-German Alliance against Russia, but that did not require them to undertake military action.
[25][26][7] On 22 July, Enver Pasha, the Ottoman Minister of War, had proposed an Ottoman–German alliance to Baron Hans Freiherr von Wangenheim, the German ambassador in Constantinople.
[29] Enver Pasha, knowing that the Ottomans would lose them, had offered to sell the ships to Germany in a renewed attempt at obtaining a treaty of alliance.
The British Pursuit of Goeben and Breslau failed when the Ottoman government opened the Dardanelles to allow them passage to Constantinople, despite being required under international law, as a neutral party, to block military shipping.
The key decision was to keep Russia out of Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia by giving it Constantinople after the Ottomans were defeated.
Russia had always wanted control of Constantinople and the Straits, primarily so that it could have free access to the Mediterranean Sea, and so it agreed to these terms in November.
Admiral Souchon learned that Austria-Hungary would provide no naval aid in the Mediterranean and that the Ottoman Empire was still neutral and therefore he should no longer make for Constantinople.
[46] On 6 August 1914, at 1:00 a.m., Grand Vizier Said Halim Pasha, summoned the German ambassador to his office to inform him that the Cabinet had decided unanimously to open the Straits to Goeben and Breslau and to any Austro-Hungarian vessels accompanying them.
[47] On 9 August, the Grand Vizier requested for the Goeben to be transferred to Ottoman control "by means of a fictitious sale", but the government in Berlin refused.
Winston Churchill stated about the escape of the ships: Admiral Souchon was cruising irresolutely about the Greek islands endeavoring to make sure that he would be admitted by the Turks to the Dardanelles.
[48]On 16 August, Cemal Pasha presided over the formal commissioning of the Goeben and the Breslau, which were renamed Yavuz Sultan Selim and Midilli respectively, and their officers and crews into the Ottoman Navy.
The directive, which went over the head of Cemal Pasha, the Navy Minister, was presumably issued by Enver as acting commander-in-chief although Souchon's place in the chain of command was unclear.
[35] As per the naval mission headed by Guido von Usedom, Souchon was to receive a one-year commission in the Ottoman Navy, which would place him directly under the orders of Cemal Pasha.
[50] On 25 October, Enver instructed Souchon to manoeuvre in the Black Sea and to attack the Russian fleet "if a suitable opportunity presented itself".
The Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sergey Sazonov, declared that it was too late and that Russia considered the raid an act of war.
The Ottomans prepared an offensive against Egypt in early 1915 and aimed to occupy the Suez Canal and cut the Mediterranean route to India and the Far East.
According to A History of the Modern Middle East (2018) by William L. Cleveland, the declining empire had various unlikely successes during the war and "its ability to endure four years of total warfare testified to the tenacity with which its civilian and military populations defended the Ottoman order."
[69] Five juridical opinions legitimised the call, which was for the first time for all Muslims, particularly those in territories ruled by the colonial powers of Britain, France and Russia, to rise against the infidel.
[69] The main burden of providing combat manpower fell on the Turkish peasantry of Anatolia, which accounted for some 40% of total Ottoman population at the outset of the war.
Even the pro-Entente Cemal Pasha recognised that the Ottomans had no choice but to conclude an agreement with Germany and the Central Powers to avoid being left isolated in another moment of crisis.
In exchange for money and future control over Russian territory, the Ottoman government abandoned a neutral position and sided with Germany.
[65] Wangenheim was assigned to Constantinople, but Souchon's presence was accidental, and for his service, he was awarded the Pour le Mérite, Germany's highest military order, on 29 October 1916.
With the questionable legality of the British requisitioning of two modern battleships and the public outrage that followed, the action opened the position to Admiral Souchon.