Polybius describes the system for the distribution of watchwords in the Roman military as follows: The way in which they secure the passing round of the watchword for the night is as follows: from the tenth maniple of each class of infantry and cavalry, the maniple which is encamped at the lower end of the street, a man is chosen who is relieved from guard duty, and he attends every day at sunset at the tent of the tribune, and receiving from him the watchword—that is a wooden tablet with the word inscribed on it – takes his leave, and on returning to his quarters passes on the watchword and tablet before witnesses to the commander of the next maniple, who in turn passes it to the one next to him.
If any one of them is missing, he makes inquiry at once, as he knows by the marks from what quarter the tablet has not returned, and whoever is responsible for the stoppage meets with the punishment he merits.
[11] In modern times, user names and passwords are commonly used by people during a log in process that controls access to protected computer operating systems, mobile phones, cable TV decoders, automated teller machines (ATMs), etc.
A typical computer user has passwords for many purposes: logging into accounts, retrieving e-mail, accessing applications, databases, networks, web sites, and even reading the morning newspaper online.
Similarly, the more stringent the password requirements, such as "have a mix of uppercase and lowercase letters and digits" or "change it monthly", the greater the degree to which users will subvert the system.
[21] Effective access control provisions may force extreme measures on criminals seeking to acquire a password or biometric token.
Some systems impose a time-out of several seconds after a small number (e.g., three) of failed password entry attempts, also known as throttling.
[3] : 63B Sec 5.2.2 In the absence of other vulnerabilities, such systems can be effectively secure with relatively simple passwords if they have been well chosen and are not easily guessed.
Some systems, such as PGP and Wi-Fi WPA, apply a computation-intensive hash to the password to slow such attacks, in a technique known as key stretching.
The most widely used is the Transport Layer Security (TLS, previously called SSL) feature built into most current Internet browsers.
Most browsers alert the user of a TLS/SSL-protected exchange with a server by displaying a closed lock icon, or some other sign, when TLS is in use.
Moving a step further, augmented systems for password-authenticated key agreement (e.g., AMP, B-SPEKE, PAK-Z, SRP-6) avoid both the conflict and limitation of hash-based methods.
Some websites include the user-selected password in an unencrypted confirmation e-mail message, with the obvious increased vulnerability.
The user's identity is verified by asking questions and comparing the answers to ones previously stored (i.e., when the account was opened).
Some password reset questions ask for personal information that could be found on social media, such as mother's maiden name.
Single passwords are also much less convenient to change because many people need to be told at the same time, and they make removal of a particular user's access more difficult, as for instance on graduation or resignation.
This problem is exacerbated by also reusing usernames, and by websites requiring email logins, as it makes it easier for an attacker to track a single user across multiple sites.
[44] Similar arguments were made by Forbes in not change passwords as often as many "experts" advise, due to the same limitations in human memory.
More recently, many security experts such as Bruce Schneier recommend that people use passwords that are too complicated to memorize, write them down on paper, and keep them in a wallet.
To facilitate estate administration, it is helpful for people to provide a mechanism for their passwords to be communicated to the persons who will administer their affairs in the event of their death.
[54][55] Most organizations specify a password policy that sets requirements for the composition and usage of passwords, typically dictating minimum length, required categories (e.g., upper and lower case, numbers, and special characters), prohibited elements (e.g., use of one's own name, date of birth, address, telephone number).
These latter, more specific rules were largely based on a 2003 report by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), authored by Bill Burr.
In a 2017 article in The Wall Street Journal, Burr reported he regrets these proposals and made a mistake when he recommended them.
These categories include user-related information, keyboard combinations and patterns, placement strategy, word processing, substitution, capitalization, append dates, and a combination of the previous categories[61] Attempting to crack passwords by trying as many possibilities as time and money permit is a brute force attack.
Studies of production computer systems have consistently shown that a large fraction of all user-chosen passwords are readily guessed automatically.
(He nevertheless maintained, based on these data, that the general quality of passwords has improved over the years—for example, average length was up to eight characters from under seven in previous surveys, and less than 4% were dictionary words.
[72] A 2012 paper[73] examines why passwords have proved so hard to supplant (despite numerous predictions that they would soon be a thing of the past[74]); in examining thirty representative proposed replacements with respect to security, usability and deployability they conclude "none even retains the full set of benefits that legacy passwords already provide."
[94] They argue that "no other single technology matches their combination of cost, immediacy and convenience" and that "passwords are themselves the best fit for many of the scenarios in which they are currently used."
Following this, Bonneau et al. systematically compared web passwords to 35 competing authentication schemes in terms of their usability, deployability, and security.
The authors conclude with the following observation: "Marginal gains are often not sufficient to reach the activation energy necessary to overcome significant transition costs, which may provide the best explanation of why we are likely to live considerably longer before seeing the funeral procession for passwords arrive at the cemetery."