In addition to Pearl Harbor, over seven hours Japan launched coordinated attacks on the U.S.-held Philippines, Guam, and Wake Island; and on the British Empire in Malaya, Singapore, and Hong Kong.

The three U.S. carriers stationed at Pearl Harbor escaped damage because they were at sea at the time, and important base installations, including its oil storage and naval repair facilities, were not attacked.

While there were historical precedents for unannounced military action by Japan, the lack of a formal warning and perception that the attack had been unprovoked led U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt to famously label December 7, 1941, "a date which will live in infamy".

Japan had been wary of American territorial and military expansion in the Pacific and Asia since the late 1890s, followed by the annexation of islands, such as Hawaii and the Philippines, which they felt were close to or within their sphere of influence.

[27][28] Although Japan had begun to take a hostile stance against the United States after the rejection of the Racial Equality Proposal,[29] the relationship between the two countries was cordial enough that they remained trading partners.

[33] In a memorandum dated October 24, 1934, Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs Stanley K. Hornbeck discussed his meeting with Teagle to U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, and how Standard Oil New Jersey head Walter C. Teagle was also uncooperative with U.S. recommendations and also given special treatment by the Japanese government, who made him and Standard Oil New Jersey less subjected to Japan's national business regulation policies than they did other companies.

"[33] Starting in December 1937, events such as the Japanese attack on USS Panay, the Allison incident, and the Nanking Massacre swung Western public opinion sharply against Japan.

[46][page needed][47] The American ambassador to Japan repeatedly urged Roosevelt to accept the meeting, warning that it was the only way to preserve the conciliatory Konoe government and peace in the Pacific.

"[23][page needed] Preliminary planning for an attack on Pearl Harbor to protect the move into the "Southern Resource Area", the Japanese term for the Dutch East Indies and Southeast Asia generally, began early in 1941 under the auspices of Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, then commanding Japan's Combined Fleet.

[52][53] He won assent to formal planning and training for an attack from the Imperial Japanese Navy General Staff only after much contention with Naval Headquarters, including a threat to resign his command.

[54] Full-scale planning was underway by early spring 1941, primarily by Rear Admiral Ryūnosuke Kusaka, with assistance from Commander Minoru Genda and Yamamoto's Deputy Chief of Staff, Captain Kameto Kuroshima.

The leaders of the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) ascribed to Alfred Thayer Mahan's "decisive battle" doctrine, especially that of destroying the maximum number of battleships.

Second, it was hoped to buy time for Japan to consolidate its position and increase its naval strength before shipbuilding authorized by the 1940 Vinson-Walsh Act erased any chance of victory.

[67][page needed] On November 26, 1941, a Japanese task force (the Striking Force) of six aircraft carriers – Akagi, Kaga, Sōryū, Hiryū, Shōkaku, and Zuikaku – departed Hittokapu Bay on Etorofu (now Iterup) Island in the Kuril Islands, en route to a position northwest of Hawaii, intending to launch its 408 aircraft to attack Pearl Harbor: 360 for the two attack waves and 48 on defensive combat air patrol (CAP), including nine fighters from the first wave.

[citation needed] Before the attack commenced, the Imperial Japanese Navy launched reconnaissance floatplanes from heavy cruisers Chikuma and Tone, to scout Oahu and Lahaina Roads, Maui, respectively, with orders to report on American fleet composition and location.

[77] At 03:42 Hawaiian time, the minesweeper Condor spotted a midget submarine periscope southwest of the Pearl Harbor entrance buoy and alerted the destroyer Ward.

For decades, conventional wisdom held that Japan attacked without first formally breaking diplomatic relations only because of accidents and bumbling that delayed the delivery of a document hinting at war to Washington.

Of this, Iguchi said, "The diary shows that the army and navy did not want to give any proper declaration of war, or indeed prior notice even of the termination of negotiations ... and they clearly prevailed.

[119] Captain Mervyn Bennion, commanding West Virginia, led his men until he was cut down by fragments from a bomb which hit Tennessee, moored alongside.

[citation needed] According to some accounts, several Japanese junior officers, including Fuchida and Genda, urged Nagumo to carry out a third strike in order to sink more of the Pearl Harbor's remaining warships, and damage the base's maintenance shops, drydock facilities and oil tank yards.

[143] In retrospect, sparing the vital dockyards, maintenance shops, and the oil tank farm meant the United States could respond relatively quickly in the Pacific.

WNBT from New York was the only TV station that was regularly airing that day in the country, with the comedy movie Millionaire Playboy, which was scheduled for 3:30-4:30 PM, being interrupted with the news of the attack.

Only three days after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the battleship Prince of Wales and battlecruiser Repulse were sunk off the coast of Malaya, causing Churchill later to recollect "In all the war I never received a more direct shock.

[citation needed] During the second wave, a Zero fighter flown by Petty Officer Shigenori Nishikaichi of Hiryu was damaged in the attack on Wheeler, so he flew to the rescue point.

While six of the eight battleships were repaired and returned to service, their relatively low speed and high fuel consumption limited their deployment, and they served mainly in shore bombardment roles (their only major action being the Battle of Surigao Strait in October 1944).

A major flaw in Japanese strategic thinking was a belief that the ultimate Pacific battle would be fought by battleships, in keeping with the doctrine of Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan.

The survival of the repair shops and fuel depots allowed Pearl Harbor to maintain logistical support of the Navy,[191][192] such as the Doolittle Raid and the Battles of the Coral Sea and Midway.

Patrick called Mitchell's subsequent report, which identified vulnerabilities in Hawaii, a "theoretical treatise on employment of airpower in the Pacific, which, in all probability undoubtedly will be of extreme value some 10 or 15 years hence".

Admiral James Richardson was removed from command shortly after protesting President Roosevelt's decision to move the bulk of the Pacific fleet to Pearl Harbor.

Several writers, including decorated World War II veteran and journalist Robert Stinnett, author of Day of Deceit, and former United States Rear Admiral Robert Alfred Theobald, author of The Final Secret of Pearl Harbor: The Washington Background of the Pearl Harbor Attack, have argued that various parties high in the American and British governments knew of the attack in advance and may even have let it happen or encouraged it in order to force the United States into the war via the so-called "back door".