But when judicial instance and interpretative procedure recognize and accept, even go out to find, every possible technicality of the law to protect the defendant, to block thwart, hinder, embarrass and nullify prosecution, then the peoples' right are jeopardized and the basic reason for courts stultified."

"If technicalities are to be the order and the way for the criminally charged either to avoid justice altogether or so to delay prosecution as to cripple it, then it behooves our courts and the legal profession to cut away the dead wood and the entanglements.

Prior to the actual matter of contempt being brought before the court, it first resolved the question of whether the proper method of review would be through writ of certiorari or appeal.

[1] Justice William G. Terrell wrote for the majority, in which the court held that the appellant's convictions were valid, writing,"The court is shown to have followed approved procedure, is not charged with being arbitrary or unfair, and offered to retire from the case if appellants felt that they would prefer to be tried by another judge, so there is no merit to the error assigned on this point."

Sebring's dissent, however, was only one sentence long, and reads, "I concur in the conclusion reached that the judgment appealed from must be reversed on authority of Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 [(1941)].

"With this conclusion, however, Pennekamp and the Miami Herald filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States.

In a unanimous decision, with Associate Justice Stanley F. Reed writing the opinion, it held that "the danger to fair judicial administration has not the clearness and immediacy necessary to close the door of permissible public comment", and reversed convictions of Pennekamp and the Miami Herald.

A theoretical determinant of the limit for open discussion was adopted from experience with other adjustments of the conflict between freedom of expression and maintenance of order.

Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion is quite lengthy, and appears to put much weight in understanding the true importance behind a free press and Bridges v.

"[4] Justice Murphy's concurring opinion is a lot shorter, and can be summarized simply as follows,"Were we to sanction the judgment rendered by the court below, we would be approving, in effect, an unwarranted restriction upon the freedom of the press.

That situation is not even remotely present in this case"[5] Justice Rutledge's concurring opinion is longer than Murphy's, and is generally more critical of the state of legal reporting, and seems to be cautious in allowing free rein to the press in that regard.

Such a disregard for the truth not only flouts standards of journalistic activity...but...tends to bring the courts and those who administer them into undeserved public obloquy."

"In view of these facts, any standard which would require strict accuracy in reporting legal events factually or in commenting upon them in the press would be an impossible one.