Peruzzi v. Italy

The case involved Piero Antonio Peruzzi, an Italian lawyer, who was initially sentenced to four years in prison by the Lucca District Court for defaming a judge.

Peruzzi appealed this decision to the Appellate Court of Genoa and was instead fined and required to pay an additional sum to the judge subject to his criticism.

Mr. Peruzzi's argument that the criticisms expressed in his letter were not directed specifically at Judge X but rather at the Italian judicial system, in general, was rejected.

The majority noted that rather than presenting these claims at the hearing of the inheritance case, Peruzzi circulated his letter in a context that was unrelated to the proceedings, which was inevitably bound to undermine Judge X's credibility and reputation.

The interference with Peruzzi's right to freedom of expression could be considered “necessary in a democratic society” in order to maintain impartiality in the judiciary.

Neither judge could adhere to the view expressed by the majority according to which Article 10 of the Convention has not been violated in this case, “Non possiamo aderire al punto di vista espresso dalla maggioranza secondo il quale l’articolo 10 della Convenzione non è stato violato nella presente causa”.

[1] The applicant submitted a plea claiming that his freedom of expression had been infringed upon, and while it is important to justify the protection of others reputations in certain cases, it is crucial to find a balance between both rights in question.

[1] The Court identified in its case a number of factors that must be examined in order to determine whether a restriction on the freedom of expression is justified, (see, Vonn Hannover v. Germany, Nos.

Wojtyczek and Grozev further stated that the majority failed to consider elements such as the content of the disputed claims, and whether or not the person subject to criticism has been cited by name, having been clearly accused of facts that could be damaging to their reputation.

Overall, Judges Wojtyczek and Grozev concluded that the penalty imposed was manifestly disproportionate due to the nature of the claims made and the very small group of persons to whom they were addressed.

[4] Previously, the ECHR was inconsistent in its responses to this issue, but started to err on the side of speech protection following the cases of Barfod v. Denmark and Prager v.