[11] As of 2003, Venezuela had 77.5 billion barrels (1.232×1010 m3) of conventional oil reserves according to PDVSA figures, the largest in the Western Hemisphere and making up approximately half the total.

By also including an estimated 235 billion barrels (3.74×1010 m3) of tar-like extra heavy crude oil in the Orinoco Belt region, Venezuela claims to hold the largest hydrocarbon reserves in the world.

During the presidency of Hugo Chávez the organization's payroll tripled, while oil production fell steeply, a drop of 700,000 barrels per day.

[13] In 2006, Rafael Ramírez, the energy minister, gave PDVSA workers a choice: Support President Hugo Chávez, or lose their jobs.

From 1993 through 1998, PDVSA split extraction rights with multiple multi-national companies in special arrangements called "strategic associations", in effect trading Venezuelan crude oil for the efficiency that came from outside expertise and technology.

These "strategic associations" were controversial: Venezuela was able to maximize profits at the cost of lenient taxation on the multinational companies and the loss of control over domestic resources.

[12] Before the election of Hugo Chávez, PDVSA ran autonomously, making oil decisions based on internal guidance to increase profits.

The International Labour Organization (ILO) called on the Venezuelan government to launch "an independent investigation into allegations of detention and torture," surrounding this strike.

[22][non-primary source needed] In 2005, PDVSA opened its first office in China, and announced plans to nearly triple its fleet of oil tankers, to 58.

[23] In April and May 2005, PDVSA, per an agreement signed between the governments of Venezuela and Argentina, sent 50 million tonnes of fuel oil to the latter to alleviate the effects of an energy crisis due to a shortage of natural gas.

[citation needed] In November 2005, PDVSA and its subsidiary in the United States, Citgo, announced an agreement with Massachusetts to provide heating oil to low income families in Boston at a discount of 40% below market price.

[24] Similar agreements were later set up with other states and cities in the US Northeast, including New York's Bronx, Maine, Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, Vermont and Delaware.

[4] Assets of ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips were expropriated in 2007 after they declined to restructure their holdings in Venezuela to give PDVSA majority control; Total, Chevron, Statoil and BP agreed and retained minority shares in their Venezuelan projects.

[30] In 2010, PDVSA loaned the government of Antigua $68 million to repurchase all remaining shares of West Indies Oil Company (WIOC) from Bruce Rappaport's National Petroleum Ltd.[31] In 2012, PDVSA announced that it would enter into a joint venture agreement with Eni SpA and Repsol in order to initiate a gas production project at the Cardon VI gas block in Venezuela.

[32] In February 2014, PDVSA and the Anglo-French oil firm Perenco entered into talks for a $600 million financing deal to boost production at their Petrowarao joint venture.

[36] By 2017, PDVSA could not even afford to export oil through international waters, which requires safety inspections and cleaning under maritime law, with a fleet of tankers stranded in the Caribbean Sea due to the issue.

[18] In order to correct for these shortcomings, Maduro installed more Venezuelan military members in several key PDVSA positions, in an effort to reduce the corruption and inefficiency.

[40] The companies in question lacked substantial physical presence, infrastructure, and genuine business activities, serving primarily to issue invoices and transfer funds directly to Raúl Morodo’s personal account at Banco de Sabadell.

In 2014, Raúl Morodo acknowledged committing at least one fiscal offense, resulting in a conviction to a ten-month prison sentence and fines totaling €1.4 million, to be paid jointly with his son.

[40] Alejo Morodo received a separate sentence of twenty-four months of imprisonment and is responsible for the majority of the fines due to his role in managing the instrumental companies.

The case, initially involving allegations of money laundering and political corruption linked to Morodo’s diplomatic relations with high-ranking Venezuelan officials such as Delcy Rodríguez, was later downgraded by the Audiencia Nacional to focus solely on tax evasion.

The settlement was publicly disclosed by the newspaper EL MUNDO, highlighting the extensive measures taken to address the fiscal and ethical violations committed by the Morodo family.

[41] For example, in 2015, Roberto Enrique Rincon was arrested and in 2016 pleaded guilty to bribery and tax evasion in a scheme to secure energy contracts.

[44] In August 2017, President Donald Trump's administration imposed economic sanctions against PDVSA that restricted the industry's access to credit markets.

[48] By 2023, PDVSA had not paid bills for $21.2 billion; Maduro suspended the committee and replaced oil minister Tareck El Aissami with Pedro Rafael Tellechea.

[51] In October 2018, PDVSA paid $949 million on its Citgo backed bond to investors, a payment many analysts thought was impossible for the company given its recent liquidity struggles.

[54] A separate Canadian mining firm, Rusoro, was also pursuing $1.28 billion in repayment for the prior nationalization of its assets, through the US justice system until PDVSA begins making payments.

[56] There have been worsening safety problems since 2003,[6] culminating in a gas leak at the Paraguaná Refinery Complex in August 2012 which caused an explosion, killing 48 people and damaging 1600 homes.