Phú Riềng Đỏ
Although the strike lasted only about a week, the unfolding of events at Phú Riềng Đỏ was significant as it served as a harbinger for important tactical and strategic considerations for other communist-led uprisings that followed later in the year.
On the other hand, smaller Vietnamese plantations invested little to improve their production processes because to them, scientific knowledge and advanced technology was the conduit through which new ideas could be harnessed to modernise Vietnam.
[10] As a result, the government was very involved in economic activity "[f]rom the control of goods prices and financial or fiscal support... to the policing of worker dissent" to safeguard this very profitable export industry.
[15] In response, the director of labour recruitment, Herve Bazin, provided thousands of coolies[16] to these large rubber plantations from "the overcrowded villages of the Red River Delta in Tonkin and the coastal lowlands of Annam", swelling the ranks of these poor migrant workers from 3,242 in 1922 to 41,750 in 1928.
Hence, although the colonial authorities tried to stamp out the danger of communist infiltration in 1929 – 1930 by getting the Sûreté to screen and "to weed out workers deemed politically undesirable and potential trouble-makers",[19] this attempt ultimately failed given the sheer numbers of labourers who were recruited.
[20] In other words, communist or communist-inspired elements who slipped through the screening found ready listeners among these impoverished workers who usually felt compelled to extend their unfavourable contract because the accumulation of debts necessitated their repeated borrowing from moneylenders.
Consequently, both land and individual taxes had "to be paid in... solid silver piasters, which peasants often had to acquire solely for this purpose at marked-up rates of exchange from money lenders or landlords.
[citation needed] In the decade prior to the outbreak of Phu Rieng Do, "a small politically conscious laboring [sic] class" had emerged in the 22,000 Vietnamese workers of which 36.8% were found in the modern agricultural sector.
"[32] As such, the Viet Nam Cong San Dang (VNCSD) or the Communist Party of Vietnam began to strengthen itself through "the establishment of cells in factories, railroad works, mines, plantations, schools and military units.
[34] Unsurprisingly then, at Michelin's plantation in Phú Riềng, "the party branch position was to... organize mutual aid associations, sports teams, and arts groups to bring the masses together and to win them over.
[36] To ensure success of the strike, members of this communist cell began to establish "hidden food caches, and making a pact with some of the local tribespeople whereby the latter promised not to serve as strikebreakers for the French.
"[37] In reality, however, many of these coolies "had little or no intention of remaining in the position of full-time proletarians" but were instead more eager to return to their homes in northern Vietnam after fulfilling their contracts or having earned enough to pay the obligatory colonial taxes and other debts.
"[39] The strike at the sprawling 5,500 hectares Michelin rubber plantation[40] in Phú Riềng took place on 4 February 1930, the sixth day of Tết, the Vietnamese Lunar New Year.
When he discovered a spy sent by the plantation management to gather intelligence for the work cessation the day before, he gave chase but was arrested by French foremen who accused him of theft instead.
[58] Regardless of the actual dates, however, both narratives agree that the funeral and the arrest of Lu were trigger events for the strike, which culminated in the workers surrounding Soumagnac's office, forcing him to telephone for military aid.
[69] When news of Phu Rieng Do reached Jean-Félix Krautheimer, Lieutenant-Governor of Cochinchina, he despatched the gendarmerie regiments from Biên Hòa and Saigon to the plantation to restore peace.
"[73] Pierre Pasquier, Governor-general of Indochina, defended Krautheimer's decision as he was convinced that "'credulous' plantation workers made willing, if unwitting, communist recruits",[74] which reflected his assessment of Phu Rieng Do as a communist-instigated unrest.
"[79] Although there were no casualties or major damage to property, the heavy sentences of between six months and five years' imprisonment meted out to the ringleaders reflected the "combination of harsh labour discipline and fear of sedition that informed government responses to industrial protest.
[citation needed] Given the priority for economic output, living conditions on the plantation were "abysmal" with frequent outbreaks of malaria, only to be made worse by food and water that were often contaminated or scarce.
[94] In general, the entire "rubber plantation work force never exceeded 41,000 in any one year"[95] because the harsh conditions resulted in high numbers of death and escape.
[96] Tellingly, just one year into operation, the death rate of Phu Rieng workers in 1927 was a high 17%, which was considered a conservative figure as the plantation management had reason to under report.
"[101] Bullying was also institutionalised with the European overseers contriving "an extensive system of fines to punish coolies for infractions and alleged violations of plantation rules" which usually resulted in the docking of wages.
[104] This was a challenge to the governments in Hanoi and Saigon long used to reaping high profits from rubber exports and "taxes imposed on commercial property and on migrant workers flooding into Cochin-China's wage economy.
[107] However, the plantation owners and the authorities failed to grasp the potential impact of the workers' grievances as the former was more concerned about declining profits while the latter, ironically, was nervous over possible dissent in the top export industry of rubber.
This rendered the upper hierarchy a mere follower in the face of the agency exercised by the lower echelons that "acted independently, without directives, to lead the people against the French.
"[112] Therefore, while Phu Rieng Do was a communist-instigated strike, its launch had no authorisation from "either the Regional or Central committees of the VNCSD as part of the overall strategy for Viet Nam [sic].
The dilemma that Trần Tử Bình and his comrades faced when they deliberated on their next course of action was a case writ large for careful consideration of strategy and tactics in subsequent communist-instigated uprisings.
Therefore, while stalemate rendered the Phu Rieng cell leaders passive, the decisions made by communist higher echelons in the case of Nghệ-Tĩnh Soviets where the party overplayed its hand in a "suicidal struggle against great odds", almost led to its total annihilation as an organisation.
