Pierson v. Post

As they drew near the fox, Jesse Pierson, another local resident, saw the fox—though he denied seeing Post and his party—and promptly killed it and carried it off for himself.

Pierson v. Post is generally considered the most famous property law case in American legal history.

The judges chose not to follow common law precedent on wild animal capture, and so were forced to synthesize reasoning from a variety of well-known historical legal treatises—ranging from the Institutes of Justinian in the 6th century to the writings of Henry de Bracton in the 13th century and Samuel von Pufendorf in the 17th century—into a coherent principle on how property can be first possessed by a human being.

On appeal after the trial, the issue put to the Supreme Court of Judicature of New York was whether one could obtain property rights to a wild animal (Ferae naturae), in this case the fox, by pursuit.

[4] The lesser known historical context is that Pierson was one of the proprietors who had inherited special rights in the undivided lands where the fox was caught.

The same principle is recognized by Bracton.Puffendorf defines occupancy of beasts feræ naturæ, to be the actual corporeal possession of them, and Bynkershoeck is cited as coinciding in this definition.

The foregoing authorities are decisive to show that mere pursuit gave Post no legal right to the fox, but that he became the property of Pierson, who intercepted and killed him.

[Citations omitted]The court reasoned that given the common law requirement to have control over one's possessions, merely giving chase was not sufficient.

Among the authorities cited by the court in its opinion were the works of William Blackstone, Fleta, Jean Barbeyrac, Samuel von Pufendorf, Hugo Grotius, and Justinian I.

Instead he argued that pursuit should be considered sufficient, as it serves a useful purpose of encouraging hunters to rid the countryside of that "wild and noxious beast" known as the fox.

Livingston further acknowledged that possession can be seen in relative terms where the continued chase may merely be a formality of the pre-existing control already exerted by the hunter.

This became the leading case often cited because it established; and I think, for the first time, by the court of last resort in the State, that to give an individual right in wild animals, the claimant must capture them.