[1][2][3] On 17 July 2024, fighting began over Prohres, a village in central Donetsk Oblast, and Russian forces entered it the following day, in their first major advancement directly towards the city of Pokrovsk.

[7] The breakthrough, reportedly caused by heavy airstrikes which led to the collapse and subsequent retreat of the 110th and 47th Mechanized Brigades, allowed for quick advances along a previously stable frontline.

[8][15] Forbes additionally reported that the 47th Brigade lost two M1 Abrams tanks during the engagement around Prohres and that Ukrainian forces had suffered high casualties.

[20] The Russian advances following the capture of Prohres and the "tense and difficult" situation east of Pokrovsk were attributed to a lack of Ukrainian manpower and equipment,[9][21][18] deficient training, and decreased morale.

[29] Amidst Ukraine's incursion into Russia's Kursk Oblast, fighting near Pokrovsk increased around 13 August, with a reported increase to 52 battles in a day in the area, greater than a third of all engagements across the frontline;[30] a representative of the 110th Mechanized Brigade stated that the situation near Pokrovsk had deteriorated since Ukraine's incursion, attributed to shortages in ammunition and continual Russian offensive efforts.

[32] A Ukrainian official told Agence France-Presse that the incursion into Kursk had little effect on fighting in the east but that the "intensity of Russian attacks" had decreased slightly over the weekend.

[53][54] President Volodymyr Zelenskyy acknowledged the recent advances made by Russia east of Pokrovsk the same day, and announced that its forces were being bolstered in the area.

[55] Russia continued moving south on 22 August to capture Ptyche and advance in the direction of Kalynove,[54] and reportedly gained a foothold in eastern Novohrodivka.

[56][57] The ISW analysed that the recent southern advances were likely due to a Ukrainian withdrawal from positions in the area to avoid encirclement by Russian forces.

The ISW assessed that the recent Russian advance through Novohrodivka, taken place in only a few days, was in part due to Ukraine not attempting to maintain defensive positions within the city,[65] where they reportedly had a 4–1 disadvantage in firepower,[66] and instead opting to abandon the settlement.

[73] Civilians continued evacuating from Pokrovsk, while most of the city's businesses and infrastructure finished closing, such as hospitals and supermarkets, their contents being transported away from the frontline.

[78][79] Ukrainian brigades newly deployed to the area made multiple counterattacks: in Selydove, a city crucial to further Russian offensive success where momentum had stalled,[79][78] in Halytsynivka, and in Mykhailivka.

[83] Russian forces reportedly shifted their tactics near Selydove away from frontal assaults to employing small groups moving through covered areas.

The ISW stated that the footage confirming this latter advance meant that Ukrainsk "may have" been captured, while also assessing that these attacks on the city's flanks were being preferred over a direct frontal assault[92] as encirclement efforts continued.

West of Ukrainsk, Russian forces continued advancing, reaching the railway line north of the settlement of Tsukuryne[96] and south of Selydove,[97] a city vital for the defence of Pokrovsk.

[97] Footage on 30 September showed that Tsukuryne had been entered in the southeast, while a Ukrainian officer stated that the settlement had shifted to become a priority target for Russian forces in the area.

[101] The head of Pokrovsk's administration stated on 4 October that four fifths of the city's critical infrastructure had been destroyed from Russian attacks, and that its remaining inhabitants had been left without water, power, and gas.

[111] On 22 October, the commander of the Aidar's 24th Separate Assault Brigade, Stanyslav Bunyatov, stated that half of the city was captured by Russian forces, citing lack of manpower as an issue.

[113] Russian forces were able to hoist their flag in the central part of Selydove, with the ISW stating that Russia had made "significant tactical advances" both in and around the city.

[114] Russian forces also advanced to the outskirts of the village of Vyshneve in late October, further deteriorating Ukrainian control over the supply lines to the city.

[126] On 13 January 2025, Reuters reported, citing unnamed industry sources, that the Pokrovs'ke coal mine had halted production due to the approaching front line.

[130] On 2 September, David Axe estimated that the Russians had suffered casualties of "potentially tens of thousands of soldiers" while advancing towards Pokrovsk following the capture of Avdiivka in February 2024.

[75] In an interview with Times Radio on 5 September, British defence analyst Michael Clarke estimated that the Russians were losing 1,000 men killed or wounded per day on average during the Pokrovsk offensive, and had also lost "well over" 100 armored vehicles over the past week alone.

[131] Two Russian assaults on 12 and 19 September, carried out with a total of 98 vehicles, were claimed by the Ukrainian 46th Air Mobile Brigade to have been repulsed in a week defending Kurakhove.

[132] On 19 September, Ukrainian analyst Petro Chernyk claimed that fighting near Pokrovsk had resulted in the "pre-emptive extermination of 2-3 thousand enemy personnel".

[133] On 11 December, the ISW reported that a Ukrainian brigade officer claimed that Russian forces lost nearly 3,000 personnel in the Pokrovsk direction in two weeks.

[134] On 5 January 2025, the ISW reported that a Ukrainian intelligence officer operating in the Pokrovsk direction claimed that Russian forces are suffering up to 400 personnel casualties per day.

[135] On 2 February 2025, Ukrainian C-in-C Oleksandr Syrski claimed that Russian forces had suffered 15,000 casualties, including 7,000 killed in action, in the Pokrovsk direction in January 2025 alone.

[145] Russian forces typically attack and perform operations with small infantry groups, where they are relatively effective at advancing through villages and are harder for Ukrainian drones to target.

[153][154] The Kyiv Post reported that by 4 January 2025, the brigade had lost all of its CAESAR self-propelled howitzers, most of its VAB APCs, and a portion of its Leopard 2 tanks.