[2] However, he warns against internal forces leading to stagnation and political decay within liberal democracies, which threatens the future of this form of government.

[2] Scholars, administrators and politicians advocated for, and eventually built, agencies administered by experts selected on the basis of merit and education instead of political hacks.

[3] This governmental change reflects “a social revolution brought about by industrialization, which mobilized a host of new political actors with no interest in the old clientelist system.”[2] The American example shows that democracies can build strong states, but Fukuyama argues that the process requires much effort, over time, by powerful players not tied to the older patrimonial political system.

[3] By contrast, East Asian countries like Japan and South Korea, with a tradition of strong central government, meant that an authoritative state could survive democratic empowerment.

[3] Dysfunctional politics in Latin America, Fukuyama claims, is partially due to fewer wars and consequent weaker states.

While Western institutions and models of development have been successful within their own societies, “each society must adapt them to its own conditions and build on indigenous traditions.”[4] Fukuyama makes the argument that patronage behavior is rooted in the following biological roots: Fukuyama argues that humans, by biological disposition, are likely to favor friends and family over others, leading to patrimonialism.

[6] Fukuyama argues that in the modern world, the institutions best accomplish this feat is a strong state coupled with the rule of law and democratic accountability.

[4] Fukuyama described American politics as a system of “courts and parties,” where legal and legislative mechanisms are valued more than a competent administrative government.

[3] This favoritism towards excessive checks and balances lead to a "vetocracy," where a small interest group can veto a measure beneficial to the public good.

[5] Unlike France, Germany or Japan, Fukuyama argued, state capacity in America came after the rule of law and democratic politics, and it has always been weaker and viewed with distrust.

Instead, Congress allows private parties to liberally sue in court, resulting in unthinkable transformations of the law and drastic growths in legal proceedings.