Political positions of Anton Denikin

It determined the policy and nature of the organization of the state, administrative and military authorities of the Volunteer Army and the Armed Forces of South Russia (VSYuR) in the territories under its control during the Civil War.

Possessing essentially dictatorial power and being a supporter of a constitutional monarchy, Denikin did not consider himself entitled (until the convocation of the Constituent Assembly) to predetermine Russia's future state structure.

He tried to rally the broadest possible sections of the population around the white movement under the slogans "Fight against Bolshevism to the end", "Great, united and indivisible Russia", "Political freedoms", "Law and order".

In modern Russian and Ukrainian historiography, in contrast to the earlier Soviet one, it is not customary to call Denikin's agrarian legislation focused on protecting the interests of landlord landownership.

[4] In national politics, Denikin adhered to the concept of "one and indivisible Russia", which did not allow to discuss any autonomy or self-determination of the territories that were part of the former Russian Empire within the pre-war borders.

Although Denikin did not issue a similar order regarding soldiers, artificially inflated requirements for Jewish recruits accepted into the army led to the fact that the question of the participation of Jews in the VSYuR "decided by itself.

"[7] Denikin himself repeatedly appealed to his commanders "not to turn one nationality against another", but the weakness of his power on the ground was such that he could not prevent pogroms, especially in conditions when various influential bodies in the territories controlled by the VSYuR, and even part of the military administration itself (Orthodox religious institutions, the OSVAG propaganda agency) carried out an anti-Jewish agitation: they put an equal sign between Bolshevism and the Jewish population and called for a "crusade" against the Jews.

He was skeptical about the state abilities of his Don and Kuban allies, believing that the territory subordinate to him “could give a representative body intellectually no higher than the provincial zemstvo assembly”.

The contradictions were not of a political nature: the reasons for the disagreements were the difference in the vision of the two generals on the issue of choosing allies and the subsequent strategy for the forces of the white movement in the south of Russia, which quickly became in mutual accusations and diametrically opposed assessments of the same facts.

[citation needed] The starting point of the conflict arose in April 1919 as a result of Denikin's ignorance of Wrangel's secret report, in which he proposed to give priority to the direction of the offensive of the white armies by Tsaritsyn.

Police functions in the territories controlled by Denikin were carried out by the State Guard, and by September 1919 their number reached almost 78,000 people, despite the fact that the entire army during this period consisted of 110,000 bayonets and sabers.