Preemptive war
U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster wrote that when a nation uses force "within the territory of a power at peace, nothing less than a clear and absolute necessity can afford ground of justification" and that the necessity for the use of armed force must be "instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation," which conditions did not apply in this case.
"[11] The Austro-Hungarian Chief of the General Staff, Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf, argued for a preemptive war against Serbia in 1913.
[12] The assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand (June 1914) was used as an excuse for Austria-Hungary to attack Serbia, leading to World War I.
All of the victorious nations emerging out of World War I eventually signed the agreement, with the notable exception of the United States.
[16] In the 1920s, the League peaceably settled numerous international disputes and was generally perceived as succeeding in its primary purpose.
In the Mukden Incident, Japan claimed to be fighting a "defensive war" in Manchuria, attempting to "preempt" supposedly-aggressive Chinese intentions towards the Japanese.
[18] Soon, Italy and Germany also began engaging in militaristic campaigns designed to either enlarge their borders or to expand their sphere of military control, and the League was shown to be powerless to stop them.
Norway was vital to Germany as a transport route for iron ore from Sweden, a supply that Britain was determined to stop.
The new Allied plans were Wilfred and Plan R 4 to provoke a German reaction by laying mines in Norwegian waters, and once Germany showed signs of taking action, Allied forces would occupy Narvik, Trondheim and Bergen and launch a raid on Stavanger to destroy Sola airfield.
"[24] However, the Nuremberg trials determined that no Allied invasion was imminent and therefore rejected Germany's argument of being entitled to attack Norway.
At the time, American decision-makers claimed that Saddam's weapons of mass destruction might be given to militant groups and that the nation's security was at a great risk.
Congress passed its joint resolution in October 2002, authorizing the American president to use military force against Saddam's government.
Many critics have questioned the true intention of the administration for invading Iraq, based on possibility of retaliation in the September 11 attacks.
NATO's Deputy Assistant Secretary General for WMD, Guy Roberts, cited the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the 1998 US attack on a Sudanese pharmaceutical plant, (identified by US intelligence to have been a chemical weapons facility) and the 1981 Israeli attack on Iraq's nuclear facility at Osirak as examples of the counterproliferation self-help paradigm.
[48] The intention with a preemptive strike is to gain the advantage of initiative and to harm the enemy at a moment of minimal protection, for instance, while vulnerable during transport or mobilization.
[49] When a nation possesses a first strike advantage and believes itself to have a high probability of winning a war, there is a narrower de facto bargaining range between it and an opposing country for peaceful settlements.
The lack of trust that leads to a declining power's preemptive strike stems not from uncertainty about intentions of different nations but from "the situation, the structure of preferences and opportunities, that gives one party incentive to renege" on its peaceful cooperation and exploit its increased military potential in the future to win a more profitable peace settlement for itself.
However, in the modern framework of the UN Charter, it is the phrase "if an armed attack occurs" in Article 51[50] that draws the line between legitimate and illegitimate military force.
[39] Some scholars believe it is reasonable to assume that if no armed attack has yet occurred that no automatic justification for preemptive 'self-defense' has yet been made 'legal' under the UN Charter.
