In 1919, diplomatic ties were established between the Soviet regime and the Emirate of Afghanistan – a development that was perceived by the British Foreign Service as contrary to UK interests.

In April 1923, Amanullah Khan promulgated a new constitution in Afghanistan, heralding a program of secularisation that included prohibition of both polygamy and the marriage of minors, and lifting a legal requirement for women to cover their faces in public.

[vague] Meanwhile, Amanullah Khan had founded the Afghan Air Force, which was augmented with state-of-the-art De Havilland DH.9A light bombers gifted by the UK.

In September 1924, following an invitation of Amanullah Khan, a group of 11 Soviet flight instructors arrived in Kabul, ostensibly to train Afghans in the use of a Soviet-built variant of the DH.9A, the Polikarpov R-1.

[2] On 15 September 1927, the Soviet Politburo decided to transfer to Afghanistan 12 Polikarpov R-1 light bombers, two anti-aircraft batteries (comprising eight guns), and funding for a dedicated flight school.

[3] At the same time, a wave of religiously conservative immigrants who had fled Central Asia as it came under Soviet control, were becoming influential in northern Afghanistan.

He accused Amanullah Khan of violating sharia, and in the areas that he controlled, reversed secularisation, abolished conscription and land taxes, and cancelled debts; these policies attracted significant support.

[7] In addition, Khabibulla established close contacts with Ibrahim Bek, as leader of the Basmachi, and Mohammed Alim Khan, the former Emir of Bukhara.

Afghan historian Mir Gulam Muhammad Gubar, a contemporary of those events, wrote that the reign of Habibullah was a tragedy for the country.

Airplanes, having made two rounds of the deployed front, sank and fired machine guns at the Afghan border guards.

Meanwhile, a detachment led by Vitaly Primakov, crossed the Amu Darya and landed on the Afghan coast via motor boats, cabins and barges.

A garrison of 100 sabers immediately went to Patta Gissar, but after five miles of the road collided with the enemy and was destroyed by machine gun fire.

On the night of 18 April, the governor of Mazar-i-Sharif, Mirza Kasym, summoned the Soviet Consul General, with whom he had friendly relations, and demanded clarification on what was happening.

Two hours after the start of the battle, the gunners brought the guns to the entrance to the citadel and, having launched a volley, broke the gate.

Our airplanes, which didn't even have stars on the wings painted over, flew daily over the enemy area and dropped bombs in the most unceremonious way.

It is possible that some of the foreigners managed to photograph these scenes and then it will be difficult for us to deny it.During the week of the campaign, 500 Hazaras joined the detachment, of which they formed a separate battalion.

[15] At the council of heads of administrations, military leaders and Islamic scholars, it was decided to declare a jihad against the invasion of the "infidels" on their land, to gather a militia to meet the enemy.

Numerous, but poorly armed Afghans, with prayers and religious chants, went on the attack in a thick formation in an open area under gun and machine-gun fire.

If I take it, then we are masters of the situation, if not, we’ll turn to a gang and look for ways to go home.On 5 May 1929, to help Primakov’s detachment, a second Red Army detachment of 400 men was sent with 6 guns and 8 machine guns, under the command of a certain Zelim Khan (there is no direct documentary evidence of this, but many facts indicate that it was the commander of the 8th cavalry brigade of the Central Asian Military District, Ivan Yefimovich Petrov).

On the way, he was confronted by a border outpost, which "in a matter of minutes was swept away" by the machine gun fire of the Red Army.

[4][3] On 6 May, on the positions of the Afghans, near Mazar-i-Sharif, the Central Asian Military District aviation launched bombing and assault strikes.

Within a two-day period, the Zelim Khan squadron, after a quick throw, went to Mazar-i-Sharif on 7 May and, together with the Primakov’s detachment, attacked the Afghans who had retreated to Dehdadi.

Of course, if both detachments appeared simultaneously from opposite sides, then, having 10-12-fold superiority in manpower, they could crush the detachment.Seyid Hussein, leaving his units, fled.

In the documents of military units, this operation is listed as The Elimination of Banditry in South Turkestan, and its description in historical works was prohibited.