Deputy Solicitor General Edwin S. Kneedler represented the United States government as amicus curiae in support of the Hawaii law's constitutionality.

The February 2000 court ruling in Rice v. Cayetano encouraged Hawaiian sovereignty opponents to file a similar lawsuit, Arakaki v. State of Hawai‘i, months later.

The District Court for the State of Hawaii ruled against Rice, due to its conclusion (as summarized by the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals) that "the method of electing OHA trustees meets constitutional standards for the essential reason that the restriction on the right to vote is not based on race, but upon recognition of the unique status of native Hawaiians that bears a rational connection to Hawaii's trust obligations."

The District Court held that the OHA does not sufficiently resemble a typical government bureau, with governmental powers, and that it is "carefully constrained by its overall purpose to work for the betterment of Hawaiians."

There, he would argue that the eligibility requirements subverted the original intended purpose of the public lands as written in the Annexation and Organic Acts, both of which granted subsequent benefits to all "inhabitants" of Hawaii, regardless of race.

Therefore, he claimed, the elections do not qualify as "special purpose" under Salyer, nor does the eligibility requirement denote a political rather than racial classification.

When Queen Lili'uokalani took steps in 1893 to counter this imposition, she was overthrown in a coup d'état by the Committee of Safety which was composed of white businessmen, missionaries and colonists (both Hawaiian citizens and foreign nationals).

The Annexation Act stipulated that all revenues and proceeds from the use of this public land would "be used solely for the benefit of the inhabitants of the Hawaiian Islands for educational and other purposes."

The Organic Act similarly held that all "funds arising from the sale or lease or other disposal ... shall be applied such uses and purposes for the benefit of the inhabitants of the Territory of Hawaii."

In 1978 the state Constitution was amended to provide for the Office of Hawaiian Affairs (OHA), which would hold the lease on those lands not already under the purview of the HHCA.

The Petitioner's Brief notes that at the time of their transfer, "these 'public lands' were held by the Republic of Hawaii free and clear of any encumbrances or trust obligations.

The Petitioner would use population statistics up through the turn of the 20th century to show that the Kingdom of Hawaii had been "consciously multiracial," and thus the term "inhabitants" referred to numerous races, including Westerners.

Furthermore, the date of 1778 had obviously been chosen for the eligibility requirements because "it marks the last days of what might be characterized as the era of relative 'racial purity' in the Hawaiian Islands."

The Petitioner also denies that Salyer, with its "special limited purpose" exception to the 14th Amendment's Equal Protection clause, is appropriate in this case.

The 9th Circuit Court thus made a grievous error when it determined that this case was "'not the sort [of election] that has previously triggered Fifteenth Amendment analysis'."

The Petitioner quotes from Gomillion v. Lightfoot (1960) to illustrate that the 15th Amendment is absolute, no matter how carefully constructed the means to a racially discriminatory end.

Quoting Lane v. Wilson (1939) as well, the Petitioner notes that the 15th Amendment "'nullifies sophisticated as well as simple-minded modes of discrimination'" and goes on to say that "In contrast to the purportedly race-neutral grandfather clauses, white primaries, and gerrymanders invalidated in the foregoing cases, the OHA voting restriction is startlingly 'simple-minded'.

This is because the "'disproportionate effect' prong requires, at a minimum, that the costs of those activities be borne disproportionately by those granted the right to vote ... the Salyer exception, therefore, cannot be applied to the OHA, a state agency that expends substantial funds drawn from taxes paid by all citizens of Hawaii without regard to race" (20).

The Petitioner sarcastically notes that "The Respondent now takes the position that the State of Hawaii has a compelling interest in engaging in blatant discrimination today – and indefinitely into the future – in order to make up for even-handed treatment of all Hawaiian citizens, regardless of race, in the past" (32).

After reiterating that the voting qualifications are political rather than racial, and that the elections qualify for "limited purpose" and "disproportionate effect" exceptions, the Respondent turns quickly to the heart of the matter: the "special relationship."

Yet, with the creation of the HHCA in 1921, "Congress has recognized that it has a special relationship with indigenous Hawaiians, and has sought to enable them to benefit in some measure from their homelands" (6).

The Respondent goes on to quote Congress' contemporary assertion that the HHCA "affirm[ed] the trust relationship between the United States and the Native Hawaiians" (42 U.S.C.

So does the recognition that the "constitution and statutes of the State of Hawaii ... acknowledge the distinct land rights of the Native Hawaiian people as beneficiaries of the public lands trust ... [and] reaffirm and protect the unique right of the Native Hawaiian people to practice and perpetuate their cultural and religious customs, beliefs, practices, and language" (42 U.S.C.

In a 7–2 decision based entirely on the 15th Amendment, they reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit, with Justices Stevens and Ginsburg dissenting.

They note that the 15th Amendment is certainly not bound by the language or circumstances surrounding its enactment, and that it is "quite sufficient to invalidate a scheme which did not mention race but instead used ancestry in an attempt to confine and restrict the voting franchise" (16).

As for Morton v. Mancari, were Hawaii's voting restrictions to be sustained under that authority, "we would be required to accept some beginning premises not yet established in our case law" (22).

Nor is the restriction based on beneficiary status rather than race, for "although the bulk of the funds for which OHA is responsible appears to be earmarked for the benefit of 'native Hawaiians', the State permits both 'native Hawaiians' and 'Hawaiians' to vote" — that is, both those who qualify with a 50% blood quantum and those who qualify as descendants of residents in 1778 — and "[this] classification thus appears to create, not eliminate, a differential alignment between the identity of OHA trustees and what the State calls beneficiaries" (27).

Yet, again, such details are irrelevant to the Court, for "Hawaii's argument fails on more essential grounds ... [i.e.] the demeaning premise that citizens of a particular race are somehow more qualified than others to vote on certain matters.

Justice Stevens' dissent, joined in part by Justice Ginsburg, takes a much more charitable view of the "special relationship" between Hawaii and the United States, believing that "two centuries of Indian law precedent" alone justifies the OHA's voting laws under the Constitution, for "there is simply no invidious discrimination present in this effort to see that indigenous peoples are compensated for past wrongs" (3).

As for Breyer's concurring opinion, Stevens succinctly dismisses the objection that the OHA's definition of native is not "reasonable" by noting simply that "this suggestion does not identify a constitutional defect" (9).