Sir Richard Arthur Blackburn OBE (26 July 1918 – 1 October 1987) was an Australian judge, prominent legal academic and military officer.

The annual Sir Richard Blackburn Memorial lectures in Canberra commemorate his service to the Australian legal community.

[2] His father was at that time a prominent legal practitioner in South Australia, and was later to serve as a Commissioner of the now defunct Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration.

He served with the Second Australian Imperial Force (2nd AIF) on active service in North Africa and Papua New Guinea[4] until his discharge on 7 November 1945 as a captain in the 2/9th Division Cavalry Regiment.

He and another South Australian, the Honourable Justice Andrew Wells, became the first Dominion students to be awarded the Eldon Law Scholarship.

In 1957 he left full-time academic life to become a partner in the Adelaide law firm Finlaysons; however, he continued as a member of the Faculty until 1965.

[3][4] Blackburn was appointed an Officer of the Order of the British Empire (OBE) on 1 January 1965 in honour of his military service.

[4] It was during his judicial life in the Northern Territory that he decided the first significant case concerning Aboriginal Land Rights in Australia.

At his retirement ceremony, Faulks J, speaking on behalf of the legal profession said:[4] Amongst the lessons we have learned from you, Chief Justice, is the importance of humanity and understanding in the practise of the law.

Your Honour has shown in word and in example that humility and an appreciation of the other's point of view are the hallmarks of a good lawyer, whether he be judge, solicitor or barrister.In 1986 he was elected an Honorary Fellow of St Mark's College.

Blackburn was also invited to give the first Harrison Memorial Lecture at the Royal Military College at Duntroon after the Officer Training School was moved from Portsea.

Blackburn concluded:[17] '[P]roved misbehaviour' means such misconduct, whether criminal or not, and whether or not displayed in the actual exercise of judicial functions, as, being morally wrong, demonstrates the unfitness for office of the judge in question.