Robert Coulondre

In August 1914, Colondre was commissioned as a lieutenant in the 117th Infantry Regiment and on 13 September 1914 he won the Croix de Guerre and the Legion of honor for bravery in an action against the invading Germans.

[15] Coulondre later wrote that the Quai d'Orsay's information about the Soviet Union was almost non-existent as discovered looking through the files "that relations with the USSR, established in 1924, had been neither very close nor very well cultivated since then, notwithstanding the pacts".

French public opinion is sick and tired of Comintern meddling in the domestic affairs of France-meddling, which we know-is inspired if not directly operated by the Soviet government itself...Either it shall cease or the pact will become a dead letter".

[21] For his part, Coulondre soon had the impression that the Soviets were unhappy with the Blum government's stated desire to preserve the peace, and would had much preferred that if a more traditional "tough guy" French conservative leader like Louis Barthou or Raymond Poincaré were leading France.

Coulondre later wrote in his memoirs that the accused in both trials "confessed in a monotonous tone...animated by a kind of automatism...all have an immense repentance...It follows for me under the evidence that they recite a lesson learned".

[28] Coulondre's statements that the Red Army had been weakened by the execution of much of its leadership, was used by opponents of the Franco-Soviet pact in Paris to argue that the Soviet Union was not a major power, and hence not worth cultivating.

[28] The same month, Litvinov was interviewed by the Moscow correspondent for Les Temps where he expressed himself with what Coulondre called much "avec sevérité" about Franco-Soviet relations, saying that the French were not taking the alliance very seriously.

[39] The British chargé de affairs, Gordon Vereker reported to London that he was "slightly mystified as to the motives of M. Coulondre's invitation, for I have always understood that he is usually reserved and uncommunicative".

[39] Vereker told Coulondre that his view was that the "Russians were Asiatics...and that with present Byzantine regime in the Kremlin anything might happen", concluding that the Red Army would be no match for the Wehrmacht and there was no point in trying to have the Soviet Union as a counterweight to Germany for that reason.

[48] On 24 September 1938, Coulondre reported to Bonnet that the Soviets were still willing to stand by their alliance with Czechoslovakia and were criticizing President Edvard Beneš for agreeing to the Anglo-French plan to transfer the Sudetenland to Germany.

[48] At the same time, Coulondre reported that Litvinov had told him that the Soviet Union would come to Czechoslovakia's defense only if the Council of the League of Nations voted for military sanctions against Germany, which he noted was tantamount to doing nothing.

[53] Coulondre reported to Paris an odd conversation where Potemkin first in a formal and cold tone of voice said "I simply wish to state that the Western Powers have deliberately kept the USSR out of the negotiations".

[56] At his first meeting with the Foreign Minister, Joachim von Ribbentrop, the latter recorded: "M. Coulondre told me that upon taking the appointment, he intended to do all he could to improve Franco-German relations...He personally was not biased in any particular direction and was open to all suggestions".

[60] Coulondre saw little evidence of a German interest in a détente with France, and instead noted the recurring theme of Hitler's speeches was the "harshness" of the Treaty of Versailles, which justified everything his government did to end the international system established in 1919.

[67] Coulondre reported that since he arrived in Berlin, the Nazi regime had passed laws forbidding Jews to own cars; from going to museums, sports events, theaters, cinemas or concerts; from attending universities or colleges; and from going on certain streets.

[67] Under the terms of the Munich Agreement, in exchange for the Sudetenland "going home to the Reich" over a ten-day period in October 1938, Britain, France, Germany and Italy were committed to making a "guarantee" of the rest of Czecho-Slovakia (as Czechoslovakia had been renamed) from aggression.

[73] Coulondre in a dispatch to Paris wrote that "translated from the diplomatic language", the note stated that neither Britain nor France had "no longer any right to interest themselves in Central European affairs".

[76] Coulondre reported to Paris that "the Munich Agreement no longer exists", and stated that he believed that Hitler was still preoccupied with Eastern Europe, he would be willing to turn west if he thought that Germany was losing the arms race with Britain and France.

[76] Weizsäcker, who despite his post-war claims to have been an anti-Nazi, was in an arrogant and belligerent mood, and accordingly to his own account of his meeting with Coulondre: "I spoke rather sharply to the Ambassador and told him not to mention the Munich Agreement, which he alleged had been violated, and not to give us any lectures...I told him that in view of the agreement reached last night with the Czech government I could see no reason for any démarche by the French ambassador...and that I was sure he would find fresh instructions when he returned to his embassy, and these would set his mind at rest".

[77] Coulondre, a diplomat known for his toughness, refused to accept Weizsäcker's insolent behavior, telling him that the French note had been written after "due consideration" and he would not take it back to be revised.

Coulondre subsequently believed that these British diplomatic moves indirectly helped make the Molotov–Ribbentrop pact possible, as he wrote in De Staline à Hitler:"The Reich could not attack Russia by land without using Polish or Romanian territory, that is to say, since 13 April, without bringing into play the guarantee of the Western powers and consequently triggering war with them.

Stalin had obtained, indirectly and without having to commit himself, the shield in the West which he had been seeking for ten years...he could safely watch developments and carry on a double game in a way dear to the Russians.

Writing about the Danzig crisis on 30 April 1939, Coulondre sent a dispatch to Bonnet saying Hitler sought:"....a mortgage on Polish foreign policy, while itself retaining complete liberty of action allowing the conclusion of political agreements with other countries.

[104] In support of this thesis, Coulondre mentioned that earlier that day, he had met the German "specialist on France", the "shady writer" Friedrich Sieburg, who had told him: "the situation was worsening quickly in Germany.

[110] Coulondre however reluctantly accepted the Dahlerus plan as it committed Germany to negotiate with Poland to resolve the Danzig crisis, which Hitler had been refusing to do until then, which led to hopes that here was a possible means of preventing a war.

The Kriegsmarine battleship SMS Schleswig-Holstein which had arrived in Danzig harbor on 25 August fired the first shots of World War II in Europe at about 4: 45 am on 1 September by bombarding the Polish fort on the Westerplatte, to be followed up by German forces invading Poland as dawn broke that day.

Coulondre was in the garden of the French embassy at about 8:30 am on 1 September supervising the building of air raid trenches when he heard word that Germany had attacked Poland earlier that morning.

[119] Attolico told Ribbentrop that based on his talks with Henderson and Coulondre that the Anglo-French notes of 1 September were not ultimatums, and that Germany should attend the peace conference to be hosted by Benito Mussolini.

[122] At 8:28pm the same evening, Henderson telephoned Coulondre to say he had received a cable from London telling him that he was to deliver a very important message to Ribbentrop the next day, which he guessed would be an ultimatum and Britain would be at war with Germany tomorrow.

Why go for the armistice conditions?...For France the situation is the same as if we continue the fight, but let's go alongside the Anglo-Saxons with our fleet, the remains of our army which can go to North Africa or England, our air force.