Robert Wash

[1] During his term, the pro-slavery judge, who owned slaves himself,[2] wrote the dissenting opinion on several important freedom suits, including Milly v. Smith, Julia v. McKinney and Marguerite v.

[7] Acting Governor Frederick Bates appointed Wash to the position of Deputy Attorney General of the Louisiana Territory in November 1811.

[7] During the War of 1812, Wash served as a lieutenant in Alexander McNair's mounted regiment[8] and then as aide de camp on the staff of Benjamin Howard.

[9][10] Wash traveled with Howard on an expedition up the Mississippi River from St. Louis to Peoria as part of a plan to strike the Fox and Sac Indians campaigning with the British.

Wash was prescient in his thinking that unless proper dikes were built, the west side of the river channel would eventually be choked with sand bars, a situation that did come to pass.

In 1826, bankrupt, elderly miller David Shipman's creditors seized and sold two of his slaves to satisfy a portion of his debt.

Faced with further foreclosure, the Kentucky resident asked his adult nephew, Stephen Smith, to provide security for him.

In Jefferson County, he signed manumission papers for them, effectively freeing Milly, her three children and two young men.

Having plans himself to resettle in St. Louis, Smith hoped to discover his uncle's whereabouts and recover the slaves as “portable wealth.”[14] Catching up with Shipman in Illinois, Smith confronted his uncle, who acknowledged his debt, noting that he had left sufficient property in Kentucky to satisfy any foreclosure.

[14] In the resulting dispute, the five freed people pressed suit to re-establish their freedom from Smith in the Circuit Court of St. Louis.

Writing for majority, Justice McGirk stated: “[T]he question submitted to us is, whether Milly is by law entitled to her freedom?

But there are two sides to every question; here is also the case of a person claiming the benefit of the ordinance of Congress of 1787, for the government of the Northwestern Territory, which declares, that in that country there shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude.”[15] In his dissent, Wash asserted that “the mortgagee is the legal owner.

In this case Shipman was the qualified owner for specific purposes, and had no right to emancipate the plaintiff in Kentucky or elsewhere; indeed, it seems to be conceded on all hands, that Shipman could not have emancipated Milly by his express deed, and why give indirect and fraudulent efforts and implied assent for effect than his deed could have?

These acts of the owner surely amounted to the introduction of slavery in Illinois.”[15] Judge Wash agreed that the lower court's jury instructions had been given in error, but insisted that intent was an essential element of residence.

The intention of the owner as previously declared, is the only evidence that can exist in such a case...The intention with which a thing is done gives color and character to almost every trans[ac]tion.”[15] Marguerite v. Chouteau was one of the last of several related freedom suits begun in about 1805 with a petition from a slave named Catiche.

The granddaughter of a Natchez Indian woman, Catiche was nominally-owned by a member of St. Louis' founding family, the Chouteaus.

Another important factor was whether the slave status of an Indian claimant, who had survived the transfer of Louisiana to Spain, continued under Spanish rule and remained under U.S. law.

This time, McGirk and Tompkins found for Marguerite, on the basis the circuit court had erred in jury instruction, and ordered a new trial.

[17] In his dissent, Judge Wash asserted that regardless of territorial transfer, the rights of the owners of Indian slaves "are secured and protected as well by the law of nations as by the express stipulations of the cession to the United States."

[18] This freedom suit by an enslaved woman of color hinged on the question of whether or not a slave was forfeited if taken into territory where slavery was prohibited.

The St. Louis Circuit Court found against Rachel, asserting that Stockton had no say in where he lived since that was decided by the Army.

Speaking for the full court, Judge McGirk declared, Stockton's “voluntary act [was] done without any other reason than that of convenience,” not necessity... “and those claiming under him must be holden to abide the consequences of introducing slavery both in Missouri territory and Michigan, contrary to law.

The judgment of the Circuit Court is reversed.”[15] The ruling in Rachel v. Walker was referenced as a precedent in the Dred Scott trials.

Having lived for a time in the free state of Illinois, before she came to the Berry and Wash households, Polly sued Joseph Magehan for her freedom.

These sudden attacks were of frequent occurrence..."[1] After retiring from the court, Wash lived among family and friends at his St. Louis home for the rest of his life.

St. Louis Circuit Court Summons for Robert Wash in the case Polly Wash v. Joseph M. Magehan