In 1865, the Romanian General Staff (inspired by the French system) created the 2nd Section (Secția a II-a) to gather and analyze military intelligence.

Among its responsibilities of leading judicial and law enforcement matters nationally, it would also occupy itself with gathering intelligence pertaining to events and offences with a political footprint.

Funded centrally and with a focus on gathering information pertaining to the security of state borders, a key distinguishing feature was the complete independence from regional politics thereby ensuring a stable and organised entity.

In parallel with law enforcement developments, select intelligence and counter-intelligence units were being created by the Romanian Army with a remit of both at home and abroad.

Simultaneously, there were significant political and social issues emerging in the aftermath of the first world war which would continue to overshadow national security decisions for decades to come.

It is critical at this point to highlight that the geographic location of Romania was considered strategically advantageous for political, economic and military interests and coveted for its rich natural resources.

By 1925, after several years of efforts, Mihail Moruzov managed to convince the General Staff about the necessity of a secret service that uses civilian employees to gather intelligence of interest to the Romanian Army.

Moruzov's leadership of the Secret Service occurred during a time of turbulent socio-political developments, including the rise of the Iron Guard, the threat of Communism and the uncertain role of the Monarchy.

His activities, which often included gathering compromising information about key political figures, drew the attention of Ion Antonescu who would become Head of State following the abdication and exile of King Carol II.

[2] The new service was under the direct authority of the Head of State thereby severing the influence of the army element however they would continue to collaborate on a more equal footing; it would also be funded by the Ministry of Defence and as such spending would be monitored accordingly.

During the Romanian Revolution, soon after taking power, Ion Iliescu signed the decree which integrated the Securitate into the Ministry of Defense, thus bringing it under his control.

The Romanian Intelligence Service was officially created on March 26, 1990, taking over the buildings, staff, equipment, and virtually everything that belonged to the Securitate.

On June 22, 1990, SRI officers unloaded a truck full of Securitate documents in a forest in Berevoești, Argeș County, after which they buried them with soil.

[8] The following days, miners brought by the government from the Jiu Valley violently repressed the protesters (killing several people and wounding thousands) and destroyed the opposition parties' headquarters.

[8] According to a letter to President Iliescu drafted by then-Prime Minister Petre Roman, the whole repression was organized by the secret services under the leadership of Virgil Măgureanu using the network of the Securitate.

[9] This view is supported by military prosecutor Dan Voinea, who said that all the miner groups were escorted by police and SRI agents who led them to the headquarters of parties and NGOs.

[11] In 1996, a former SRI employee, Constantin Bucur was the whistleblower who alerted the media that the Romanian Intelligence Service was performing illegal phone tappings of politicians, journalists and other public figures.

[12] Bucur was convicted for revealing top secret information,[12] but he won a trial against the Romanian state after appealing at the European Court of Human Rights.

[12] Mircea Toma, one of the journalists whose phone had been tapped also sued the Romanian state for wiretapping and preserving private conversations with his daughter, Sorana.

[12] The Romanian Intelligence Service refused to collaborate with the European Court of Human Rights, arguing that its documents are state secrets.

[18] An early controversy occurred in 1996, when Tana Ardeleanu (a journalist for Ziua who had published some articles about President Ion Iliescu) had been shadowed by SRI agents.

[20] This claim has been quite controversial, as, according to Cristian Tudor Popescu, journalists are not a threat to national security[20] and, according to historian Marius Oprea, this leads to suspicions about whether the SRI has political police activities.

[22] In March 2005, three Romanian journalists were kidnapped in Iraq by unknown abductors (later described as members of the Muadh ibn Jabal Brigades) in the Baghdad's al-Mansur district.

It was created in 2003 under the initiative of SRI director Radu Timofte, who sent a request to the Supreme Council of National Defence (CSAT) led by President Ion Iliescu.

[24] The project is financed by the E-government program of the EU, but parts of it such as interception of communications and facial recognition show that one of the goals is surveillance.

SNA is a system that, based on existing intelligence from SRI, SIE and possibly other agencies, ranks the risk of a terrorist attack on Romanian territory.