The rule has a long history in the English and American common law tradition and has been an important element of the relationship between the courts and the legislature, but its role in modern jurisprudence is less clear.
Today, determining legislative intent is a critical job that arises from the distinct and separate roles played by the judiciary and the legislature in administering justice.
Implicit in its provisions is the additional burden placed on the prosecution in a criminal case and the protection of individual rights against the powers of the state.
A 1547, a law passed that denied a lesser sentence to first-time offenders convicted of "felonious stealing of Horses, Geldings or Mares" among other offenses.
The following year, Parliament explicitly addressed the rule's use with the passage of a new law, solely dedicated to horse thievery.
It is founded on the tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals; and on the plain principle, that the power of punishment is vested in the legislative, not in the judicial department.
The rule comes into operation at the end of the process of interpreting what Congress has expressed, not at the beginning as an overriding consideration of being lenient to wrongdoers.
[15][16] In State v. Thonesavanh, The Minnesota Supreme Court expressly rejected the position that the rule "allows a defendant to prevail in every instance in which a criminal statute is ambiguous.
"[17] At issue was the question of whether the word "take," as used in the state's law against auto theft,[18] required the accused to actually move the vehicle, or, as in this case, merely to enter it and lock the doors.