Agencies had been screening applicants under Illinois' civil service system, making their personnel choices, and submitting them as requests to be approved or disapproved by the governor's office.

Citing Elrod v. Burns, the court reasoned that conditioning public employment on the provision of support for the favored political party "unquestionably inhibits protected belief and association.

Patronage "can result in the entrenchment of one or a few parties to the exclusion of others," and "is a very effective impediment to the associational and speech freedoms which are essential to a meaningful system of democratic government."

Employees denied transfers to workplaces reasonably close to their homes until they join and work for the Republican Party would feel a daily pressure from their long commutes to do so.

In conclusion, the court determined that promotions, transfers, and recalls after layoffs based on political affiliation or support are an impermissible infringement on the First Amendment rights of public employees.

He reasoned that when a practice not expressly prohibited by the text of the Bill of Rights bears the endorsement of a long tradition of open, widespread, and unchallenged use that dates back to the beginning of the American Republic, the Supreme Court has no proper basis for striking it down.

Thus, Justice Scalia would have held that, while the First Amendment applies in full force to private individuals, it is severely restricted in its application for government employees.

When weighed against the political heritage of the spoils system that was prevalent at the time the Bill of Rights was drafted, the court had no authority to whittle away at such a method of determining civil service.