On February 17, 1991, the McDonnell Douglas DC-9-15RC operating the flight crashed on takeoff from Cleveland during icing conditions.

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) determined that the causes of the crash were the flight crew failing to deice their aircraft, and the inexperience of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), McDonnell Douglas, and Ryan International Airlines with icing condition on DC-9-10 aircraft (the shortest variant of the DC-9).

[2]: 5–6 [5] Reay was described "as a pilot with average skills who took criticism well," and "having very good command authority and being smooth on the controls."

The second was when he gained access to the jumpseat of an aircraft operated by a different airline by using an unauthorized identity card.

[2]: 87–88 [6] The first officer was 28-year-old Richard Duney Jr., who was far less experienced than captain Reay, having only been with the airline since January 28, 1991, less than a month before the accident.

However, prior to joining RIA, he had been a pilot for a commuter airline from 1986 to 1989 and had served as a first officer on the DC-9 with USAir, but was laid off in 1991.

[2]: 88 At 23:50, the National Weather Service (NWS) issued the following weather report at CLE: Time – 2350; type – record special; ceiling – indefinite, 1,500 feet obscured; visibility – 1 mile variable; weather – light snow; temperature – 23°F; dewpoint – 19°F; wind – 220 degrees at 14 knots; altimeter – 29.91 inches; remarks – runway 5R visual range 6,000 feet plus, visibility 3/4 mile variable 1 1/2 miles.

[2]: 7 The National Aviation Weather Unit (NAWU) warned pilots flying into Ohio that there were icing conditions and turbulence.

After 0700: ceiling 4,500 feet overcast, wind 320 degrees 7 knots, chance of light snow showers.

[2]: 9–10 In other words, the weather was dangerously cold with the temperature at 23 °F (−5 °C), enough to cause ice to accumulate on aircraft, and the dew point at 19 °F (−7 °C).

There was light snow and strong winds blowing at 14 knots (16 mph; 26 km/h), increasing the risk of windshear.

At 00:06 on February 17, first officer Duney requested departure clearance from air traffic control (ATC).

The tower controller instructed the flight to "taxi [to] runway two three left via Juliet and the ramp."

00:11:03 RDO-2 Five ninety roger.At 00:14, Continental Airlines Flight 1238 informed the tower controller that they were on approach to the same runway.

[2]: 16–17  First officer Dunney was the pilot flying, and the following was recorded by the CVR:00:18:24.6 [SOUND OF ENGINES INCREASE IN SPEED] 00:18:27.0 RDO-1 Hay [sic] that's a captain's winds.

Both engines began to experience compressor stalls and the stick shaker activated, both lasting for about three seconds.

[2]: 13–14  The aircraft then flipped over and skidded along the runway, causing the cockpit and forward fuselage to separate and were destroyed.

[2]: 57  The United States Postal Service and airport workers recovered mail that had not been destroyed in the crash.

[2]: 16 According to the CVR, the most notable information was during the takeoff sequence, including captain Reay's callouts, as well as the stick shaker and engine compressor stalls.

[9][10][11] Following the Flight 1713 accident, McDonnell Douglas presented a paper warning about ice accumulation on DC-9s.

The NTSB even considered fatigue as a reason the crew did not inspect the aircraft (as well as if it was a factor in the accident altogether), the crew had been on the same flight schedule on the same route for six days and captain Reay may have been experiencing a cold; the demanding schedules can hamper illness recovery and contribute to fatigue.

Nevertheless, the NTSB had insufficient evidence and was unable to determine if fatigue did indeed play a role in the accident.

[2]: 45–48 The NTSB also noted that both Douglas and the FAA had been aware of previous DC-9 accidents in icing conditions, but had poor oversight.

[2]: 49 The NTSB published its final report nearly nine months later, stating: The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the failure of the flightcrew to detect and remove ice contamination [caused by icing conditions; in this case, the ground weather[2]: 45 ] on the airplane's wings, which was largely a result of a lack of appropriate response by the Federal Aviation Administration, Douglas Aircraft Company, and Ryan International Airlines to the known critical effect that a minute amount of contamination has on the stall characteristics of the DC-9 series 10 airplane.

[2]: 44 The NTSB determined that the accident had been caused by the icing contamination as a result of the flight crew failing to conduct an external examination of the aircraft after landing in cold weather, as well as the failure of the FAA, McDonnell Douglas, and Ryan International Airlines to respond appropriately from previous ice-related accidents, and their lack of understanding of icing condition of the DC-9-10 aircraft.

NTSB chairman James L. Kolstad, and vice chairman Susan Coughlin both gave dissenting statements; both of them agreed that pilot error was the cause of the crash, though they also stated that the failure of the airline industry as a whole to properly understand deicing was a cause of the accident.

[2]: 54  Vice chairman Coughlin stated that the NTSB should revise its probable cause to read the following:The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the failure of the flightcrew to detect and remove ice contamination on the airplane's wings, in part because of a lack of cohesive action by the aviation community at large directed at the known critical effect that a minute amount of contamination has on the stall characteristics of the DC-9 Series 10 airplane, which can lead to wing stall and loss of control during an attempted takeoff.