It was the largest Israeli military operation since the 1956 Suez Crisis and is considered to have been a contributing factor to the outbreak of the Six-Day War in 1967.

Hussein later stated that during one of his meetings with Israeli representatives: "I told them I could not absorb a serious retaliatory raid, and they accepted the logic of this and promised there would never be one.

From there it was sent to U.S. ambassador Walworth Barbour at the embassy in Tel Aviv; instead of forwarding it to the prime minister, he left the letter on his desk – assuming it was not important and there was no rush.

[7] Early on the morning of 13 November, King Hussein received an unsolicited message from his Israeli contacts stating that Israel had no intention of attacking Jordan.

[6] Early the same day also, the Israeli military mobilized 3,000–4,000 troops, and sent about 600 of these, with 60 half-tracks and 11 tanks, across the border into the Jordanian-controlled West Bank.

[10] Although the Israeli goal was retribution for the Fatah land mine incident, purportedly having originated from Jordanian-controlled territory, Israel's first act was to cross the 1949 Armistice line and to destroy a Jordanian police post at Rujm El Madfa.

In what was justified as a retaliatory attack against Fatah, ground troops moved into the village of Rujm al-Madfa located just southwest of Hebron, and destroyed its police station.

Sappers from the 35th paratrooper brigades then dynamited numerous buildings within and near the village; reports of the total number of houses destroyed range from 40 to 125 (IDF and United Nations estimates, respectively).

[9] The 48th Infantry Battalion of the Jordanian Army, commanded by Major Asad Ghanma, encountered the Israeli forces north-west of Samu.

Two companies of the Hitteen Infantry Brigade (لواء المشاة حطين) also approached from the north-east; these were composed of roughly 100 men and 20 convoy vehicles, and commanded by Col. Bahjat al-Muhaisen (العميد الركن بهجت المحيسن).

[13][14][full citation needed] Col. Muheisen's column and a platoon of Jordanian soldiers armed with two 106 mm recoilless rifles launched a counterattack, and a three-hour battle ensued, after which the Israelis withdrew across the border.

[17] Clea Bunch wrote that "the attack on Samu was the first link in a lengthy chain of miscalculations, false perceptions and high stakes gambles that steadily led to war".

[18] In Jordan, following the battle, King Hussein was faced with a storm of criticism for failing to protect Samu, emanating from Jordanians, as well as from Palestinians and neighboring Arab countries.

[19] Egyptian and Syrian radio also verbally attacked Jordan accusing King Hussein of collaborating with the CIA to plot an overthrow of the Ba'ath Party in Syria.

[20] As Palestinians rioted in Hebron, Nablus, Jerusalem on the West Bank and Irbid in Jordan, the Palestine Liberation Organization warned all Jordanian ministers to resign by noon on 26 November.

In a special parliamentary debate, Prime Minister Eshkol listed 14 major acts of sabotage carried out from Jordan in the past year, climaxed by the land-mine explosion that killed three Israeli troops on 12 November.

[22] Two days after the attack, in a memo to President Johnson, his National Security Advisor Walt Rostow wrote "I'm not suggesting our usual admonition against retaliation.

Israel's attack increases the pressure on him to counterattack not only from the more radical Arab governments and from the Palestinians in Jordan but also from the Army, which is his main source of support and may now press for a chance to recoup its Sunday losses.

[9] After hearing both sides the UK representative responded: ... my delegation can find no justification whatsoever for the calculated, admitted and wholly disproportionate act of military reprisal committed by Israel against Jordan on 13 November.

"[24] Some months later and just weeks before the Six-Day War, the U.S. ambassador in Amman, Findley Burns, reported in a telegram to the State Department that Hussein had expressed the opinion in a conversation the day before that, if Israel launched another Samu-scale attack against Jordan he would have no alternative but to retaliate or face an internal revolt.

[25]David Ben-Gurion later criticized the raid, arguing that it weakened King Hussein's position counter to Israel's interests.