Scientific pluralism

Since the development of logical positivism by the Vienna Circle in the 1920s and 1930s, theories of unified science have posited that all scientific investigation shares a common framework.

He argued that since that time the subjects of scientific disciplines had become more differentiated, with greater divergences in language and methodology, showing no move toward the unities posited by the encyclopedia's Vienna Circle authors.

[7] Other members of what came to be called the "Stanford School" supporting scientific pluralism were Nancy Cartwright, John Dupré, Peter Galison, and Ian Hacking.

[9][10] These newer pluralists also sought to address areas outside those traditionally disputed with unity of science proponents, including metascientific and metaphilosophical concerns.

Opponents of reductionism, for example, say that sciences such as sociology and psychology cannot be fully unified with physics because they involve different levels of facts that cannot be reduced to one another.

In the absence of that evidence, these pluralists believe it makes more sense for scientists to use the methods and models that appear to be most effective for their work, without any special consideration for theories of unity.