After the IDF outpost on Mount Hermon was captured by Syria on October 6, Israel decided to launch a hasty counterattack.

A company, reinforced by the battalion's supporting arms, deployed south of the lower ski lift, mostly west of the road.

The fighters deployed along the slopes descending from the curves and built positions by heaping stones between the local rocks.

The engineering troops deployed a string of exposed mines on the road about 350 meters north of the "tank curve".

In that area, two B-10 RCLs, aimed at the road leading from the upper ski lift to the outpost, and four Strela antiaircraft operators were also stationed.

On the night of October 6–7, it moved westward on foot from the Hadar area through the Hermon slopes and deployed on high point 1614.

On the morning of October 8 the battalion was still set for defending high point 1614 and did not advance westward, since the 7th Division was stopped on the Hadar-Masada road.

About an hour after contact was lost, the NC Operations Branch officer, Colonel Uri Simhoni, suggested to plan an infantry assault on the outpost.

Hofi agreed, and Drori decided to attack as soon as possible, in order to deny the Syrians time to prepare.

Shooting sounds were occasionally heard from the Hermon, leading the Golani Brigade commanders to think that the Syrians have not yet captured the outpost.

Since the evening of October 6, Peled had been studying the outpost using engineering sketches he received from the Israeli Defense Ministry's construction supervisor.

When Peled briefed the 17th Battalion before sunset, he focused mostly on the outpost structure and the methods for clearing it, and less on the order of battle, the routes and the expected difficulties.

At dawn on October 8, the Air Force unit commander and a reserve observation soldier, the last two escapees from the outpost, arrived at Bunker 103.

The column was to be led by the two tanks, while the reduced 51st Battalion and half of the reconnaissance company were to move along the ridge on foot.

The half-tracks were received or "borrowed" from the emergency reserve stores, and were only half equipped and in a bad technical condition.

[9] At 08:00 the Golani forces started making their way up the road from Masada to Majdal Shams and from there to the lower ski lift.

The force succeeded in sneaking up the Syrians undetected and opened fire, causing many casualties but one of its soldiers was killed and three wounded.

The tanks deployed in the parking lot south of the ski lift and fired at the constructions, which were empty since the 13th Battalion soldiers left them on Sunday.

A tracked bulldozer belonging to a contractor who had worked on the upper ski lift was started on Drori's order and attached to the column in case a roadblock was needed.

Due to the terrain and low visibility that morning, the column was unseen by him until it reappeared as it ascended from the lower ski lift on its way to the "tank curve".

While the motorized column was heading toward the "tank curve", at 09:30 a pair of IAF aircraft from Squadron 110 attacked the Syrian forces on the Hermon.

About twenty-two soldiers including the company commander started moving on for on the dirt road leading through the ridgeline toward high point 2072.

After a few minutes of climb, when the first team had ascended about 200 meters up the ridge, and ahead the terrain was starting to slant, the leading force suddenly spotted below and to the right a group of ten to fifteen soldiers on the move.

The battalion commander sent it after the blocking force reported that the motorized Israeli column had reached the "tank curve".

It took positions in a rocky mound about 500 meters north of the "tank curve", commanding the string of mines the Syrians had laid on the road two days earlier.

Because of the debacle and the fact that the commanders were hit, the battalion frequency became disorderly, with hysterical reports of casualties and requests for assistance.

The wounded were evacuated to the "tank curve" and then taken by half-tracks to the brigade medical corps company deployed west of Masada.

Under the cover of the heavy fog, all the armored vehicles were evacuated backwards, and all the Israeli forces retreated to the tank curve, and later to the "bus park".

The Brigade Training Base staff company was ordered to stay around Masada, but followed the column up to the lower ski lift.

Only the 12th Battalion command post and his Company A, who were ordered during the battle to reinforce the motorized column, remained at the "tank curve" until about 16:15.