After Israel's capture of it in the Six-Day War, it was used as a radar outpost, housing some of the IDF's most sensitive and secret electronic equipment.

[3] The Hermon outpost was considered strategically important for several reasons, such as: gathering early warning information, real-time intelligence collection, conducting electronic warfare (EW) against ground or air attack, artillery spotting on the Damascus plain, using the Hermon ridge and its western slopes for a strategic flanking move toward Syria, conducting operations in Syria and Lebanon and commanding Israel's main water sources.

The outpost was situated in the 13th Battalion's sector, but was commanded by Lieutenant Gadi Zidover from the 820th Regional Brigade, whose operational subordination was not properly classified.

After the patrol, the infantrymen returned to the outpost, except for three men who took up positions in an under-construction observation post on a hill north of the upper ski lift.

Shortly before 14:00, an EW blocking company from the 374th Communications unit, under the command of Lieutenant Moshe Sapir, arrived at the "tank curve" and located its equipment according to NC orders.

The 82nd Paratroop Battalion, the elite combat unit of the Syrian Army, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Ahmed Rifai al-Joju, was given its final briefing on the morning of the attack.

[11] At around 13:00, four Soviet-built MI-8 helicopters lifted off near Damascus and flew west into Lebanon, where they circled until forty-five minutes into the Syrian shelling of the Golan.

The platoon officer and the mortar sergeant climbed up to the observation point but had to come back down due to the heavy shelling.

Three Golani soldiers at the upper ski lift observation post saw the Syrian landing but failed to fire at them due to a machine gun malfunction.

After a few minutes, they abandoned their post, which was equipped with a radio, and went down to the lower ski lift to join a platoon positioned there without informing the outpost of the Syrian landing.

[16] The Syrians charged into the outpost courtyard and some managed to penetrate the upper western opening into the top storey, throwing fragmentation and stun grenades and firing into the work rooms.

[16] At about 17:30, the outpost commander and several infantry soldiers tried to break out through one of the tunnels in order to get out and reach the upper ski lift, but they encountered some Syrians and had to return.

[18] At around 16:50, the men in the "Hedva" observation post, located near the Lebanese village of Shebaa, were ordered to move back to Masada via the lower ski lift, with their armored personnel carrier (APC).

At about 17:00, the APC, along with an 81mm mortar half-track approached Wadi Si'on, (where the "Tali" observation point was located); both positions came under heavy fire from the ridge above them.

The "Tali" commander, exposed in his half-track, was hit by a bullet in the back, but the driver started the vehicle and sped off toward the lower ski lift.

The attacking Syrians were probably the blocking force from the 87th Reconnaissance Battalion, which was supposed to take up positions in the "tank curve" that night, but strayed into the area above the road from the lower ski lift and Shebaa Farms.

At nightfall, at around 17:35, after the Syrians left, the "Hedva" observation post reported the encounter to the 902nd Battalion company headquarters at Shebaa Farms and asked for assistance.

[18] At around 19:30, Barazani ordered the commander of the Hermon Company, Lieutenant Yiftah Sagiv, to head from Masada to the lower ski lift with an APC and a tank platoon from the attached 71st Battalion, to check on the outpost and evacuate the wounded that had arrived in the afternoon.

A soldier from the IAF unit in the outpost accidentally entered a 183rd Syrian Battalion position, deployed on high point 1614.

[19] At 18:07, NC accepted the suggestion raised by the Golani Brigade commander, Colonel Amir Drori, to try to reach the outpost.

Unaware of the situation throughout the Golan, Drori objected, assuming it was best to strike as early as possible and deny the Syrians time to organize.

Not knowing where the other Israelis were hiding, the Syrians called on them to surrender through the generator gratings and pointed flashlights inside, saying that whoever did not come out would be killed.

From the Syrian outpost, the prisoners were transferred by trucks to a special forces training base at Qaboun, near Damascus, where they stayed for four days.

Using a transistor radio, they heard that the Israeli settlers in the Golan had returned to their homes and so decided to keep hiding until the IDF recaptured the outpost.

At around 11:00 on Friday, October 12, Syrian soldiers entered the tunnels to look for food and caught the Israelis, including the quartermaster, by accident.

[24] In the battles fought in the outpost itself, near the upper ski lift and in Wadi Si'on, sixteen Israelis were killed and twelve wounded.

Syrian casualties were fifteen killed (twelve commandos and three helicopter crewmen) and three officers wounded trying to penetrate the outpost.

[26] With the fall of the Hermon, AMAN lost its "eyes on the Golan", the loss of the antennas on the listening posts damaged its ability to collect information.

[27] Author Abraham Rabinovich wrote that "the fall of the Hermon was for Israel the single most humiliating episode of the Yom Kippur War".

[12] Author Walter J. Boyne commented that this was the first time in Israel's history that a commander had abandoned a position while his troops were still fighting.