The Chemin des Dames ridge had been quarried for stone for centuries, leaving a warren of caves and tunnels which were used as shelters by German troops to escape the French bombardment.

Nivelle was superseded by General Philippe Pétain, who adopted a strategy of "healing and defence", to resume the wearing-out of the German Army while conserving French infantry.

Pétain began a substantial programme re-equipment of the French Army, had 40–62 mutineers shot as scapegoats, provided better food, more pay and more leave, which led to a considerable improvement in morale.

The British prolonged the Arras offensive into mid-May, despite uncertainty about French intentions, high losses and diminishing returns, as divisions were transferred northwards to Flanders.

The Battle of La Malmaison in October captured the west end of the Chemin des Dames and forced the Germans to withdraw to the north bank of the Ailette.

The French War Minister, Hubert Lyautey and Chief of Staff General Philippe Pétain opposed the plan, believing it to be premature.

[2] Nivelle threatened to resign if the offensive did not go ahead and having not lost a battle, had the enthusiastic support of the British Prime Minister David Lloyd George.

Towards the end of the Battle of the Somme in 1916, Colonel Fritz von Loßberg (Chief of Staff of the 1st Army) had been able to establish a line of relief divisions (Ablösungsdivisionen).

Loßberg considered that spontaneous withdrawals would disrupt the counter-attack reserves as they deployed and further deprive battalion and division commanders of the ability to conduct an organised defence, which the dispersal of infantry over a wider area had already made difficult.

Loßberg and other officers had severe doubts as to the ability of relief divisions to arrive on the battlefield in time to conduct an immediate counter-attack (Gegenstoß) from behind the battle zone and wanted the Somme practice of fighting in the front line to be retained and authority devolved no further than the battalion, so as to maintain organizational coherence, in anticipation of a methodical counter-attack (Gegenangriff) after 24 to 48 hours by the relief divisions.

[10] In a new manual of 1 December 1916, Grundsätze für die Führung in der Abwehrschlacht im Stellungskrieg (Principles of Command for Defensive Battle), the policy of unyielding defence of ground regardless of its tactical value, was replaced by the defence of positions suitable for artillery observation and communication with the rear, where an attacking force would "fight itself to a standstill and use up its resources while the defenders conserve[d] their strength".

[12] "Principles of Field Fortification" (Allgemeines über Stellungsbau) was published in January 1917 and by April an outpost zone (Vorpostenfeld) held by sentries, had been built along the Western Front.

The front trench system was the sentry line for the battle zone garrison, which was allowed to move away from concentrations of enemy fire and then counter-attack to recover the battle and outpost zones; such withdrawals were envisaged as occurring on small parts of the battlefield which had been made untenable by Allied artillery fire, as the prelude to Gegenstoß in der Stellung (immediate counter-attack within the position).

[15][a][b] Large reconnaissance forces were sent towards the Dallon spur on 1 April, which were not able to gain footholds in the German front defences, although the British Fourth Army to the north captured the woods around Savy.

North of the farm of La Folie, the Germans were pushed back; three 155 mm (6.1 in) howitzers and several Luftstreitkräfte lorries were captured.

French attacks could only take place at night or during twilight and snow, rain, low clouds and fog made aircraft observation for the artillery impossible.

Concrete machine-gun emplacements proved immune to all but the heaviest and most accurate howitzer-fire and the main position was protected by an observation line along the crest in front, which commanded no man's land, which was 800–1,200 yd (730–1,100 m) deep.

The French artillery had been reduced to c. 250 guns by transfers south to GAR, which was insufficient to bombard the German defences and conduct counter-batter fire simultaneously.

On the Chemin des Dames, I Corps made very little progress and by evening had advanced no further than the German support line, 200–300 yd (180–270 m) ahead.

On the east-facing northern flank near Laffaux, I Colonial Corps was able to penetrate only a few hundred yards into the defences of the Condé-Riegel (Condé Switch trench) and failed to take Moisy Farm plateau.

[10] To the east of Vauxaillon, at the north end of the Sixth Army, Mont des Singes was captured with the help of British heavy artillery but then lost to a German counter-attack.

[27] On 17 April the Fourth Army on the left of Groupe d'armées de Centre (GAC) began the subsidiary attack in Champagne from Aubérive to the east of Reims which became known as Bataille des Monts, with the VIII, XVII and XII Corps on an 11 km (6.8 mi) front.

On the morning of 1 June, after a heavy bombardment, German troops captured several trenches north of Laffaux Mill and lost them to counter-attacks in the afternoon.

Uffindell called this politically convenient, since this excluded the Battle of La Malmaison in October, making it easier to heap blame upon Nivelle.

He was replaced by the considerably more cautious Pétain with Foch as chief of the General Staff, who adopted a strategy of "healing and defence" to avoid casualties and to restore morale.

East of Reims the Fourth Army had captured most of the Moronvilliers massif and Auberive, then advanced along the Suippe, which provided good jumping-off positions for a new offensive.

Vimy Ridge, the Scarpe Heights, the caverns, spurs and plateau of the Chemin des Dames and the Moronvilliers massif had been occupied for more than two years, carefully surveyed by German engineers and fortified to make them impregnable.

[39] The French tactic of assault brutal et continu suited the German defensive dispositions, since much of the new construction had taken place on reverse slopes.

The 7th Army commander, Max von Boehn, was not able to establish a defence in depth along the Chemin-de-Dames, because the ridge was a hog's back and the only alternative was to retire north of the Canal de l'Oise à l'Aisne.

[47] In four days the attack had advanced 9.7 kilometres (6 mi) and forced the Germans from the narrow plateau of the Chemin des Dames, back to the north bank of the Ailette Valley.