[2] In R. v. Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical Society the Supreme Court of Canada found that an open-ended statute (prohibiting companies from "unduly" lessening competition) was not a breach of Section 11(a).
In R. v. Delaronde (1997), the Supreme Court of Canada found section 11 (a) is meant not only to guarantee a fair trial but also to serve as an economic right.
771, the Supreme Court of Canada clarified the test set out in Askov, noting that the accused bears a certain onus to demonstrate actual prejudice as a result of delay.
Later, in R. v. Finta (1994), the Supreme Court clarified that the period of "unreasonable delay" begins at the time the charge is laid.
This was in response to a case in which charges were laid 45 years after the alleged offences occurred; and that this was suggested to be an unreasonable delay.
Reasonableness depends, in part, on the amount of investigative work that is involved, the number of interested parties and their locations, and/or the complexity of the case.
This right has generated some case law, as courts have struck down reverse onus clauses as violating the presumption of innocence.
In R. v. Hill, 2012 ONSC 5050, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice found that the principle of presumption of innocence applies not only to a trial on the facts, but also to sentencing in circumstances where the Crown alleges that the accused is a "dangerous offender".
This has led to a controversial string of decisions surrounding the rape shield law, starting with R. v. Seaboyer (1991) and ending with R. v. Mills (1999).
Constitutional scholar Peter Hogg has written that jury selection under the Criminal Code would undoubtedly create an independent tribunal.
The right to reasonable bail was examined in R. v. Morales (1992) when a person was denied bail under section 515 of the Criminal Code, which allowed detention where it "is necessary in the public interest or for the protection or safety of the public, having regard to all the circumstances including any substantial likelihood that the accused will ... commit a criminal offence or interfere with the administration of justice".
Lamer examined the phrase "in the public interest" and found that it was vague and imprecise, and so could not be used to frame a legal debate that could produce a structured rule.
The Supreme Court considered this right in R. v. Pan; R. v. Sawyer (2001), which saw a challenge to the constitutionality of section 649 of the Criminal Code, which prohibited the use of evidence regarding the deliberation of the jury.
In the 1991 case of R. v. Furtney, the Supreme Court explained that this section does not prescribe the details of how the existence of the offence is to be made known, especially given its reference to international law, which inherently defies domestic codification.
Holding that such reviews are new trials disguised as appeals, and that a legally proper acquittal is final for the purposes of section 11(h).
The definition of "true penal consequence" has been a matter or regular debate in the Canadian courts, and remains unclear in many contexts.
Courts have generally responded to such arguments by finding that forfeiture contrary to Section 11 is "clearly not in the interests of justice," but have stopped short of applying constitutional remedies per se.
Finally, it found that "It is interesting that, as we saw, the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that successive prosecutions at the federal and state level do not automatically offend against the due process clause, the spirit and content of which bears some resemblance to s. 7 of the Charter, although the courts would act to prevent oppressive behaviour."