In the interior, the band of oases campaign continued until February 1917, after which a peace was negotiated and the area became a backwater for the rest of the war, patrolled by British aircraft and armoured cars.

[2] In the Italo-Turkish War (29 September 1911 – 18 October 1912), Italian forces occupied enclaves along the Libyan coast and the Senussi resisted from the interior, maintaining generally friendly relations with the British in Egypt.

The Western Frontier of Egypt was protected by the Egyptian Coast Guard (Lieutenant-Colonel C. L. Snow), whose commander was responsible for maintaining good relations with the local Bedouin and the Senussi.

[8] German and Ottoman officers made their headquarters at Siwa Oasis with a Senussi force of 5,000 combatants, supported by mountain guns and machine-guns, to attack Sollum, Mersa Matruh and El Dabaa on the coast and the oases further south at Bahariya, Farafra, Dakhla and Kharga.

Sir John Maxwell, the commander of British troops in Egypt, pretended to believe the excuse, assuming that it had been a provocation to force the Grand Senussi's hand.

The next night, a Zawiet (cell, monastery or hermitage) at Sidi Barrani 48 mi (77 km) east of Sollum, was occupied by 300 muhafazalar (commanders, defenders or guards) Senussi regular troops.

Sollum was 280 mi (450 km) from Alexandria, too far west for a base and too exposed to German submarines, with the lack of fast patrol boats to guard ships in the bay.

Orders were given on 20 November to form a Western Frontier Force (Major-General William Peyton) made up of composite horse and infantry brigades and supporting arms.

[13][c] On 21 November, the 2nd Battalion New Zealand Rifle Brigade, a company of the 15th Sikhs, parties of the Bikanir Camel Corps and an armoured train crewed by Egyptian gunners, was sent to Dabaa to guard the railway and patrol to the Moghara Oasis.

Gordon heard the engagement and received a message dropped from an aeroplane but the distance, quantity of baggage and small size of his force led him to decide to rely on Wallace marching from Matruh and continued to Umm er Rakham, where the cavalry rallied for the night.

Gordon ordered the guard at Umm el Rakam to reinforce and later two squadrons of the Australian Light Horse arrived from Matruh with two field guns, which opened fire at 3:15 p.m. and a chance shell landed amidst the largest Senussi party, which scattered and ran.

The Senussi gathered on the Khedival Road at Gabel Medwa, 6 mi (9.7 km) west of Matruh, which air reconnaissance and spies estimated as a force of 5,000 men, a number of Muhafizia four guns and several machine-guns.

[25] Following the Affair of the Wadi Majid, after a brief rest, Wallace sent a column to Bir Gerawla, 12 mi (19 km) south-east of Matruh late on 28 December, after the camp was spotted by air reconnaissance.

On 1 January 1916, eighty tents were seen by a reconnaissance aircrew at Gebel Howeimil, 35 mi (56 km) south-east of Matruh, but torrential rains prevented an attack on the camp for ten days.

The cavalry were not able to pursue when the Senussi on the flanks retreated, for lack of water for the horses, the condition of the ground made an armoured car advance impossible.

The WFF had gained a base 90 mi (140 km) further west than Matruh but could only land supplies in good weather and had to rely on the overland route until the Navy caught up.

As soon as the British were established at Sidi Barrani, Lukin returned as many horses and gunners as possible to reduce the demand for food, which by camel convoy took four days and needed 50–100 escorts per journey.

On 14 March, the three columns concentrated near Halfaya Pass, 3 mi (4.8 km) short of Sollum, the cavalry having caught up and the battalions with Lukin carrying water on camels.

The Duke of Westminster set off with 45 light cars and ambulances on 17 March and drove from 1:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. over unfamiliar ground, strewn with boulders, to conduct the Bir Hakeim rescue.

Patrols continued for the year and a camel convoy was captured near Jaghbub, a Senussi stronghold 135 mi (217 km) from Sollum; Italian–British raids took place during the winter.

The northern route lies to the east past several small oases and wells to the big oasis at Bahariya, which at its eastern fringe is about 100 mi (160 km) from the Nile at Minya.

[38] The British reinforced the detachments covering the Nile Valley and named the command Southern Force (Major-General J. Adye) based at Beni Suef, conveniently placed to resist an advance from the west.

It was expected to take a month to prepare an expedition of cars and camels abd to travel the 200 mi (320 km) of waterless desert from Matruh but news arrived that Ahmed was ready to leave.

The main Senussi force was based at Girba and Hodgson planned to attack with a detachment of armoured motor batteries blocking Munassib Pass near Gagaib, 24 mi (39 km) to the north-west.

[45] Hostilities allowed Italy formally to rescind all the privileges the Ottoman sultan enjoyed in Libya under the Treaty of Ouchy (17 October 1912), that had ended the first Italo-Turkish War (1911–1912).

The attempt by Mannesmann, a German agent, to fabricate a diplomatic incident on 15 August failed but the economic crisis caused by the British embargo pushed the Senussi towards war.

[54] Idris established a khatt al-nar (line of fire) across the Sirtica, to prevent raiding by al-Shtaiwi and his forces, who were armed by the Italians and whose goal was to re-establish themselves inland.

[61] Archaeological analysis of the salt pan of Kallaya, the site of a minor skirmish between Libyans on 14 November 1918, shows that they had Russian rifles captured by the Germans and Austro-Hungarians on the Eastern Front and sent to Libya via the Ottomans.

[65] In 1915 the British exploited the internal combustion engine to drive on the desert and fly over it, adding a new dimension of speed and mobility to their operations, that was beyond the capacity of the Senussi to challenge.

The technological advantages of the British and the huge, sparsely inhabited space of the desert, were conditions favouring mobility and decisive action, the opposite of the effects of industrial warfare in Europe.