He had tried to augment his powers by declaring a state of emergency, but this only provoked large-scale protests and riots calling for an end to military rule, with Buddhist activists at the forefront.
In part because of pressure from Buddhist protests, Khánh removed the Catholics Phát and Đức from the posts of Interior Minister and IV Corps commander, respectively.
They responded with a coup supported by the Catholic-aligned Đại Việt Quốc dân đảng, as well as General Trần Thiện Khiêm, a Catholic who had helped Khánh to power.
Đức, Kỳ and Thi then appeared at a media conference where they denied that any coup had taken place and put on a choreographed display of unity, claiming that nobody would be prosecuted over the events.
Convinced that Khiêm was involved in the plot, Khánh had him exiled to Washington as ambassador, and eased General Dương Văn Minh out of the political scene, thereby removing the other two nominal members of the ruling triumvirate.
Because of American pressure, he retained the popular Minh as a token head of state, while holding the real power by controlling the Military Revolutionary Council (MRC).
[1] In August, the Vietnam War expanded with the Tonkin Gulf incident, a disputed encounter between North Vietnamese and American naval vessels; Washington accused the communists of launching an attack in international waters.
On August 7, he declared a state of emergency, giving the police the ability to search properties under any circumstances, ban protests and arbitrarily jail "elements considered as dangerous to national security".
However, this only served to weaken Khánh as large demonstrations and riots in the cities broke out—with the majority Buddhists prominent—calling for an end to the state of emergency and the new constitution, as well as a progression back to civilian rule.
[6] They asked him to repeal the new constitution, reinstate civilian rule, and remove Cần Lao Party—a secret Catholic body used by former President Ngô Đình Diệm to infiltrate and control all aspects of society—members from power, and Khánh agreed.
Khánh said the instability was due to troublemaking by members and supporters of the Catholic-aligned Đại Việt Quốc dân đảng (Nationalist Party of Greater Vietnam), whom he accused of putting partisan plotting ahead of the national interest.
[18] General Huỳnh Văn Cao, a Catholic and Diệm loyalist while the former president was alive, claimed in a 1972 newspaper interview that Khiêm—by then prime minister—had asked him to join the coup.
After cowing several police checkpoints on the edge of the capital with threats of machine-gun and artillery fire,[22] the plotters put rebel sentries in their place to seal off Saigon from incoming or outgoing traffic.
[17][22] At the same time, Khiêm and Thieu's lack of public action was seen as implicit support for the coup, as their criticism of Khánh's leadership in junta meetings and private attempts to remove him were well-known.
[21] Some time later, Kỳ called in troops serving on Saigon's outskirts to come to Tan Son Nhut Air Base, the largest in the country and the headquarters of the military.
"[17] In the mid-afternoon Khánh made a radio broadcast on a loyalist system, condemning the coup and calling on the military to remain loyal, claiming that support for the "rebellious leaders" would play into the hands of the Viet Cong.
[17] The plotters thought the Americans would disapprove of their actions, as Taylor had recently talked of an "upward trend" in the war against the communists, while President Lyndon Johnson praised the "continued progress" against the Viet Cong.
[21] Kỳ then decided to make a show of force as Phát and Đức began to wilt, and he sent jets to fly low over Saigon and finish off the rebel stand.
[23] In the meantime, air force planes continued to set off flares to show their alertness, and rocket launchers and more weapons were deployed around Tan Son Nhut.
[23] Kỳ said Khánh was in complete control and that the senior officers involved in the stand-off "have agreed to rejoin their units to fight the Communists",[23] naming Đức, Phát, Lam and commander of the 7th Division Huynh Van Ton.
Ton was apparently still maintaining a hostile political stance, and threatening to break away from the Saigon regime by overseeing the area around Mỹ Tho as a virtual independent state.
[27] This was interpreted as a thinly veiled warning to Khánh that the younger officers were intent on holding significant power through the military apparatus, contrary to any plans for civilian rule.
[14][25] In later years, Cao Huy Thuan, a professor and Buddhist activist based in Da Nang, claimed that during a meeting with Kỳ and Thi a few days before the coup, the officers had discussed their plans for overthrowing Khánh.
By the end of October, the Johnson administration had become more supportive of Taylor's negative opinion of Minh and concluded that US interests would be optimized if Khánh prevailed in the power struggle.
[34] Đức said he had decided to end what he regarded as a military protest demonstration when Khánh promised to consider his concerns, and then returned to the IV Corps headquarters in the Mekong Delta.
[34] Phát was asked about the collapse of his coup attempt and he discussed his visit to the American Embassy along with labor union leader Tran Quoc Buu on the evening of September 13.
He claimed that US Embassy officials had phoned him during the coup to ask him to order his union members to refrain from agitating on industrial relations matters during the physically dangerous period.
[35] The Americans agreed with Buu's claims and privately thought he had been arrested for staging labor union activities and demonstrations unrelated to the military power struggle.
[25] On November 14, Khánh brought back Don as the deputy chief of staff, and installed fellow Da Lat General Tôn Thất Đính as his assistant.
According to Kahin, "in what was strictly a marriage of convenience",[25] Khánh had to try to ameliorate the only large civilian political force in South Vietnam, the Buddhist activists, who publicly called for a negotiated end to the war.