1968) is a leading US corporate law case concerning the board's discretion to determine how to balance stakeholders' interests.

[1] Some believe it represents the shift in most states away from the idea that corporations should only pursue shareholder value, as seen in the older Michigan decision of Dodge v. Ford Motor Co..

"[2] This meant that night games could not go ahead, and so, in the view of Shlensky, would result in lower profits for shareholders.

Importantly, the question on appeal was if Shlensky was entitled to bring a case against Wrigley at all; since this is a shareholder derivative suit, the person claiming shareholder harm (here, Shlensky) normally has to prove that the directors of a corporation committed fraud, illegal acts, or had a conflict of interest.

157 (1928)] ...the directors are chosen to pass upon such questions and their judgment unless shown to be tainted with fraud is accepted as final.