[5] An Allied army under the Prince of Nassau-Usingen had already began the siege of Kaiserswerth, in Germany, on 18 April to secure the eastern flank of the Dutch Republic.
[7] With the arrival of the Duke of Marlborough, the reinforced Allied army marched south, drove the French back and planned to lay siege to the fortress of Venlo on the Meuse.
[8] It was for this reason that, on August 20, Boufflers proposed to King Louis XIV that a diversion in Flanders was the only way to halt the French advance along the Meuse.
To the east, Hulst was connected via the Moervaart to the flooded land of Saaftingen, protected by Forts Zandberg and Moerschans, which were linked to the city by an entrenched defensive line.
To the west, the Zwanenkreek provided access to Axel, while the Hellegat in the north ensured supply lines from Zeeland remained open.
According to French reports, the dike at this position was just eight feet wide (about two meters) and further secured by heavy palisades and artillery, making an assault highly challenging.
[10] On the night of 26–27 August, three French columns advanced toward Hulst, aiming to seize the fortress or at least its key outer defenses by surprise.
Their advance towards Hulst was effectively halted by the intense fire from a Dutch battery of 15 guns stationed at the outer fortification De Verrekijker.
They requested reinforcements from the main army, and on 1 September, a detachment under D'Usson, consisting of 6 battalions and 6 squadrons, was dispatched from Lier towards Flanders.
Vauban wrote a letter to Minister Michel Chamillart on 1 September, in which he lamented the inadequate strength of Bedmar's forces, which comprised only 15 battalions initially, later rising to 20, each averaging only 400 men.
[13] Vauban described the daunting defenses—two main forts supported by three additional strongpoints, all protected by deep, water-filled moats and a large creek acting as an extra barrier.
[8] The French commanders lingered for a few days in their camp at St. Gillis and discussions arose about launching an assault on Liefkenshoek, Bergen op Zoom, or Breda.
After detailing the fortifications of Liefkenshoek, he unequivocally rejected the idea of besieging it: "Had we begun earlier in the campaign season, with ample supplies and sufficient time, I would not despair of success.
To undertake such a siege, four things are essential: 1) large armies, 2) extensive supply depots, 3) favourable weather, and 4) naval support.
Zeeland had long been notorious for its unhealthy climate, and during the Eighty Years' War, soldiers stationed there had received higher pay as compensation.