State of emergency in Brazil (1922–1927)

The state of emergency allowed the political elite of the First Brazilian Republic to defend itself with authoritarian measures at a time of crisis, but the apparent tranquility after its suspension came to an end with the 1930 Revolution.

In July the measure was resumed in the Federal District, Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, being extended and expanded to other states as the tenentists tried to overthrow the regime at gunpoint.

[6] The predominant conservative interpretation in the Supreme Federal Court (STF) and in Congress from the turn of the century was of the state of emergency as an "intermediate between that of war and full peace", in the definition of president Campos Sales (1898–1902).

[56] For historian Henry H. Keith, no other ruler of Brazil's First Republic, not even the centralizers and militarists (Deodoro da Fonseca and Floriano Peixoto), did as much as Artur Bernardes to strengthen the government against internal disorder.

This demonstrated the influence of authoritarian nationalist thinkers such as Oliveira Viana, Francisco Campos and Azevedo Amaral, who did not form their own political movement, but found favorable ground for their ideas in the interwar period, when democracy seemed demoralized and was contrasted with the example of Mussolini.

[60] When requesting a review of the Constitution, Bernardes criticized the "enthusiastic and generous idealism" of past legislators, which had produced laws that were "excessively advanced and poorly suited to our country, our race, our nature, our social and political culture".

[61] In his presidential messages to Congress, Bernardes succinctly addressed the state of emergency,[62] which, according to him, was decreed "unwillingly, but in defense of high national interests",[63] as he "having forgot that we live in a democracy, a regime of opinion, in which the will of the majority prevails, expressed at the polls, a factious and threatening minority intended to govern, imposing itself through terror and going so far as to conceive and proclaim the intention of seizing power no matter the cost".

Law-abiding citizens and a clean press would have the guarantees of the normal regime, "in addition to the tranquility arising from the certainty that the Government can act quickly and safely against any disruptors of public peace".

[68] The measure covered the Federal District and the state of Rio de Janeiro until 30 July, "with the President of the Republic being authorized to extend it for a longer period and to expand it to other regions of the national territory, if the circumstances so demand".

[110] Known as the feared "General Darkness" among his enemies,[113] Fontoura would go down in history as the greatest persecutor of the rebellious military[114] and, alongside the minister of war Setembrino de Carvalho, as one of the president's support pillars.

[142] On the other hand, in the same period the conspirators managed to visit barracks in São Paulo, Paraná, Mato Grosso and Rio Grande do Sul to recruit supporters, an activity that could not be completely hidden.

[143] In military units dispersed over large distances in Rio Grande do Sul, loyalist control over the Post Office, which forced the conspirators to communicate in person, made it difficult to coordinate the revolt, but did not prevent its outbreak in October.

[145] Such was the fear of conspiracies that even the 4th police chief Carlos Reis was summoned to testify in September 1925 due to a trip to São Paulo in the company of one of his friends, an army major considered a suspect.

[150] Raul Fernandes obtained a habeas corpus from the Supreme Court to ensure his inauguration, on 31 December, but the opposition state deputies, who met separately in the Niterói City Council, did not accept his authority and proclaimed Sodré governor.

Armed groups in the state's countryside occupied public buildings and removed municipal employees, which Sodré's followers attributed to their "respective populations", and Nilo's allies to agents of the army and the Federal District Police.

[175][176] Journalists from seven newspapers (Correio da Manhã, A Noite, O Imparcial, A Vanguarda, O Rebate, A Rua and Jornal do Brasil) were arrested after the 1922 revolt,[177] including Edmundo Bittencourt and Irineu Marinho.

[179] Maurício de Lacerda, a journalist for Correio, spent eight months in prison, had three requests for habeas corpus denied and was personally informed by major Carlos Reis that "he cannot be released.

[194] The government's authoritarian policies and internal disorder had repercussions abroad, eroding Brazil's efforts to gain prestige through a permanent seat on the League of Nations Council.

In 1924, diplomat Mello Franco commented to Félix Pacheco: "if by next September order has not yet been reestablished in the capital of the great State of the Union [São Paulo], I do not know how we will be able to plead in the Assembly and in the Council the question of our admission as a permanent member of the latter".

[206] The Prestes Column remained in an "armed protest demonstration" for years, withdrawing into exile intact, but without defeating the loyalist army or taking power in Rio de Janeiro, which was not its objective, according to Brazilianist Frank McCann.

The prisons housed military personnel (from marshals to enlisted men) and civilians, supporters of the revolts, worker activists, politicians, journalists, lawyers, doctors, dentists, pharmacists, students, civil servants, traders[211][212] and even minors.

According to Everardo Dias, who wrote extensively about the poor conditions of prisons in Rio de Janeiro, the public scandal softened the treatment after July 1925, and the government sought the appearance of legal formality.

[233] The reaction to the July 1922 revolt resulted in the arrest of worker leaders (anarchists and communists), state deputies from Rio de Janeiro, a police chief, a notary and especially journalists.

[14] This was the practice of "city cleaning", which had already been applied previously after the Vaccine Revolt in 1904;[239] innocent and guilty people were put together, and common criminals ranged from milk and money counterfeiters to thieves and murderers.

In the ports, the prisoners went to the ships Alfenas, Benevente, Belmonte, Cuiabá, Jaceguay, Campos, Jahu, Manaus and Baependi, requisitioned by Lloyd Brasileiro, and the tugboats Audaz, Mario Alves, Tonelero, Laurindo Pinta and Tenente Cláudio.

The drinking water sent by ship was described by Maurício de Lacerda as a "terrible purgative", and the food as "the worst kind of fried meat, mediocre dried cod and old, wormy beans".

One of the prisoners was Maurício de Lacerda, who denounced unhealthy accommodation, poor food, lack of medical care and death threats in a letter to deputy Azevedo Lima.

Its initial population of 200 employees, traders and settlers, attracted by the propaganda of a fertile, healthy and civilized land, was already in decline in 1924, when the first wave of prisoners arrived at the mouth of the Oyapock on 26 December.

[287] Government officials described the place as a "very common agricultural colony" and "peaceful cassava plantations",[288] and oppositionists described it as the "green hell", "Brazilian Siberia" and other nicknames with the connotation of exile and demographic emptiness.

[298] The constitutional reform also indicated the situations in which federal intervention could occur in the states, gave the president partial veto power over bills approved by Congress and restricted the applicability of habeas corpus.