Barnard described Gie as "a sophisticated, but ardent Afrikaner nationalist" who successfully championed to have the language of instruction at Stellenbosch changed from Dutch to Afrikaans.
[4] Gie saw himself as one of the leaders of "scientific-objective" history, stating in a 1920 speech to his students at Stellenbosch that to be a "scientific" historian required a "honest and objective" outlook, which could only be gained via "hard work and experience".
[3] The volksgeskiedenis defined the history of the Afrikaners as a story of larger-than-life leaders who heroically led their tough and hardy people deep into the veld to create "civilization".
[11] Gie played an important role in promoting the idea that Jan van Riebeeck who founded the Dutch East India Company's fort at what is now Cape Town was the founder of South Africa.
[13] Gie was one of the leaders of the campaign to make 6 April-the day that van Riebeeck landed at Cape Town in 1652-into a public holiday as for him this was the beginning of South African history itself.
[16] About his involvement in the Broederbond, Gie wrote: "It was especially their work, their upholding of the white man's honor [emphasis in the original], their courage, patience, and sense of freedom which gave us a South Africa where we can be happy, free and prosperous".
[18] In his dispatches to Pretoria he portrayed the Nazi regime in the most favorable light possible while constantly going on about alleged "conspiracies" by the Jews against Germany.
[20] Pirow's speech was ignored at first being only reported in the Cape Argus newspaper until the British journalist George Ward Price, the "extra-special correspondent" of the Daily Mail, brought it up in an interview with Adolf Hitler.
[20] According to the British embassy in Berlin which had learned of the contents of a meeting between Johan Paul van Limburg Stirum, the Dutch minister plenipotentiary to Germany, and Gie, Pirow's speech was not an off-hand statement, but rather the beginning of a new policy as Hertzog felt that having Germany return as a colonial power in Africa was crucial "for the future safety of the white population".
[20] According to the source, Hertzog was planning to keep Southwest Africa and also felt that Britain should not return either Tanganyika (modern Tanzania) or Cameroon to Germany.
[20] However, the source reported that for Hertzog it would be "ideal" if Germany could take over the Portuguese colonies in Africa, and that it was in this sense that Pirow's speech should be understood.
[22] Gie had an extremely negative view of the German Jews who were lining up in front of the legation on every weekday, writing to Bodenstein that he thought that most of them were Communists, and even those who were not he doubted would fit in very well into South Africa.
The memo warned that South Africa was on the verge of receiving a massive number of European Jews, which the document stated were of "...a type in question that does not inspire confidence.
Can South Africa without detriment and even danger to its national interests continue to allow its commerce and related vocations to be fed by recruits of this type from overseas?
[26] Gie stated if the Czechoslovak president Edvard Beneš was willing to accept the "Karlsbad programme" put forward by the Sudeten German leader Konrad Henlein on 24 April 1938 calling for a wide-ranging autonomy for the Sudetenland, the crisis would be settled.
Gie stated it was his impression after talking to Hitler-whom he called the "Olympian Jove"-and his entourage that they did not want a war, but "they will, however, not stand for overmuch Czech intransigence.
[27] During the height of the Sudetenland crisis in September 1938, Gie depicted Hitler in the words of the Canadian historian Michael Graham Fry as "volatile, oratorically violent, risk acceptant, fanatically determined and difficult to predict".
[27] Gie felt that Hitler was only reacting to the system by the Treaty of Versailles, but warned it was quite possible that he would order an invasion of Czechoslovakia at any given moment.
After the Munich Agreement of 30 September 1938, Gie believed that there was a real possibility of an Anglo-German understanding that might secure the peace of the world.
[28] Like te Water in London, Gie had hopes that Neville Chamberlain's plans for a four power pact consisting of Britain, France, Italy and Germany might be realised with the United Kingdom and the Reich as the senior members.
[30] In turn, the dominance of the Soviet Union would allow so-called "inferior races" to take over the world as Sir Nevile Henderson, the British ambassador to Germany, put it.
[31] In a dispatch to Herzog on 3 May 1939, Gie wrote that the German claim to Danzig was "just and right", and accused Poland of being the principle danger to the peace of the world.
[31] Gie also stated that he believed that Adolf Hitler did not intend to start a war, but that German public opinion might push him into a rash move, especially if the Poles continued to refuse to allow Danzig to rejoin Germany.
[32] The other two diplomats whom Henderson often saw were the Belgian minister Vicomte Jacques Davignon and the Italian ambassador Baron Bernardo Attolico.
[32] Davignon, Attolico and Gie were all supporters of the line that the Free City of Danzig should be allowed to "go home to the Reich", which was also Henderson's long-standing belief.