Tây Sơn military tactics and organization
Conceived and applied by military leader Nguyen Hue under whom the Tây Sơn forces engaged into a series of combat operations and skillfully defeated experienced and trained, regular troops, of Cambodia, Siam, Laos, the Chinese Qing empire and the domestic feudal armies of the Trịnh Lords, Nguyễn Lords and the imperial Lê dynasty.
The Tây Sơn brothers considered themselves champions of the people and received widespread popular support from the peasantry, from indigenous highland tribes, ethnic Chinese sea traders and troops of the Ly Tai and Dinh families.
Leader Nguyễn Huệ announced that the idea was to end feudal oppression, remove corrupt officials and redistribute land, reunite the country and restore the legitimate Lê emperor to power.
Patriotism, a just cause, rules and policies implemented to enforce fair, egalitarian treatment and food distribution for all, provided a solid moral basis and stood in stark contrast to the oppressive exploitation of the feudal regime of the landlords.
Laurent André Barisy, a French naval officer in Nguyễn lords service, reported on the forces of the Tây Sơn fleet led by Vũ Văn Dũng as follows: "This force consists of 673 vessels, that include large warships armed with cannon and crew comparable to the largest Western-style warships of Nguyễn Ánh."
Jeaptiste Chaigneau, in Quy Nhơn, states in a letter, that the Tây Sơn navy had 54 battleships, 93 battleboats, 300 gunboats, and 100 sailing boats.
According to an account of Western witnesses, the Tây Sơn entertained a form of people's war, in which virtually all able-bodied men were drafted, including monks, children from the age of 15, old man, smugglers, pirates and ethnic minorities.
The women and young girls were required to join the baggage train and work in support of the army[1] On June 25, 1786, La Bartette states in a letter to Blandin; "They destroyed the finest churches, also all their temples where they captured all the monks and took them to battle."
Bertette and Dousssain, who had been evangelizing in Thuận Hóa for a long time, wrote in a letter dated June 11, 1788, Nguyễn Huệ sometimes dispatched between two and three hundred thousand troops.
The rivers between the islands served as base and ambush stage for the Tây Sơn navy, that was instructed to draw enemy ships into confined areas and single them out where it was easier to deal with them.
The Tây Sơn troops would spend the day hidden in secret shelters and only struck again, when the situation was advantageous for successful combat.
Under the guise of heavy winds, Nguyễn Huệ sent some ships with wooden troop decoys and under full banners to approach the enemy while they still beating the drums.
[10] On December 20, 1788, Tây Sơn reinforcements under the command of Nguyễn Huệ (who was by then Quang Trung emperor) advanced to the Tam Điệp mountains.
Chúng nó sang đây là mua lấy cái chết đó thôi, ta đã định mẹo cả rồi".
During this time, Quang Trung secret to preparing attack, deciding a plan to kick Qing enemy inside Đại Việt get out their territory.
[11] The French Clergyman Le Breton wrote in a letter on August 2, 1788: "As it happened Nguyen Hue returned to Phu Xuan in early July.
According to Nguyễn Huệ's own account he once led an infantry and cavalry contingent in a 10 days march from Phú Xuân to Thăng Long in order to catch and execute Vũ Văn Nhậm.
A distance of more than 600 km (372.82 mi) as roads traverse mountains and cross rivers, in a 10 days march with such a large army is extraordinary.
[9] In the offensive in 1786, while the commander of Trịnh army was out of alert, the Tây Sơn troops began their journey on 28 April lunar month, that 25 May 1786.
In the critical situation known to be attacked, Trịnh was still not alert, suggesting that the Tây Sơn troops could not advance to Thăng Long quickly.
Qing army and Lê Chiêu Thống are in preparation for the Tết holiday, which is not well protected, plus Sun Shiyi's arrogance makes them really surprised.
