Military reforms resulting from the Yên Bái mutiny
French troops were never numerically sufficient to assert control of the populace and then maintain Pax Gallica in the colony, thus requiring local reinforcements.
After the pacification campaign was officially completed in 1897, the two main functions of the colonial army were the maintenance of internal peace and external security.
The Garde indigène, a paramilitary force, was primarily responsible for dealing with disturbances of the peace and thus played an important role in the repression of public demonstrations and popular unrest.
[2] In the areas bordering China, the military had a much more active role in securing the frontier against incursions by smugglers, bandits, and politically motivated militants.
[3] The dilemma was that the French needed local soldiers to maintain the Union's internal and external peace, but could not rely on them too deeply because of an innate distrust.
French concerns about disloyalty resulted from a fear that the colonialised soldiers would turn their weapons on their masters, or desert them in an emergency situation.
One possible rationale for this measure was to break up any undiscovered VNQDD cells and to sever personal ties, within units and between soldiers and civilians in their local district.
The mass transfer of soldiers also had the effect of creating a state of constant mobilisation, denying troops the time and opportunity for anti-colonial organisation.
This train of thought further reinforced French perception that subversive ideas came from the outside rather than domestically: of the 57 soldiers involved in the mutiny, 17 had served abroad.
[6] In addition to punishing soldiers, tightening dismissal regulations and reducing the number of Vietnamese servicemen in France, the French decided to improve the military intelligence service.
[7] In terms of coordination, an inquiry into the mutiny at Yên Bái showed that cooperation between Resident Massimi and Commandant Le Tacon did not exist despite multiple requests, and that this was partly responsible for the failure to prevent the uprising.
Although the relationship between the civilian authorities in Tonkin and the military were traditionally marked by rivalry, Yên Bái stood out in the total lack of military–civilian cooperation.
For such reasons, Patrice Morlat wrote that the mutiny at Yên Bái allowed the Sûreté to "penetrate indirectly into the military sector which had till then been inaccessible".
By October 1929, after heavy civilian criticism of the military's information policy in July, army authorities had realised the need to systematically gather intelligence to deal with the threat from new forms of anti-colonial organisation.
Commandant Le Tacon, who had been responsible for organising the local SRM, had been unable to understand the graveness of the predicament despite several warnings.
These oversights were particular to Yên Bái, whereas planned VNQDD mutinies in many other garrisons, such as Kien An, Phu Lang Thuong, Nam Dinh and Sept Pagodes, were prevented at the last moment.
A month after the mutiny, General Commandant Superior Aubert circulated SRM Notice 660, on March 11, 1930, to describe (and prescribe) the morale and techniques needed for an effective intelligence service.
The French were often not tactful and discreet enough, and many were not, due to a lack of language skills or interest, "in real contact with the indigenous warrant officers."
Despite the air of good appearance and behaviour of the Vietnamese warrant officers and tirailleurs, they often misled their French superiors about their knowledge of subversive activities.
They complained that while the chief French provincial administrator could dismiss a native Garde indigène without notice if they were regarded as suspect, this was virtually impossible in the army due to legal constraints.
While the guidelines for sacking remained narrow, with only the highest officer in Indochina allowed to authorise these measures, and only under certain conditions, the last clause in the decree of April 8 could be interpreted freely.
The report mentions the creation of a "centre of Annamite studies" in Toulouse as a first step in improving language skills and put high expectations on the fact that the "number of tirailleurs speaking French is increasing constantly".
However, improvement in horizontal communication was not what the report principally had in mind, but rather using language skills as a tool of command to reinforce hierarchical relationships.
Furthermore, the experience of Roman Catholic missionaries indicated that language specialisation was becoming increasingly ineffective in countering the trend towards more secretive and effective anti-colonial organisation.
The lack of European troops at Yên Bái – aside from Massimi's and Le Tacon's personal failures – had been pinpointed as the cause of the mutiny.
The proposal held that if the local commanding officer had more European troops at his disposal, their presence would have deterred the Vietnamese soldiers from taking part in the mutiny.
Although this was plausible in that one of the leaders of the mutiny had attempted to foment his Vietnamese colleagues by pointing to the weak French presence, this internal argument overlooked the haphazard command and security procedures that had left Yên Bái vulnerable.
Its reversal demonstrated the concern about the impact of revolutionary propaganda on the loyalty of Vietnamese troops, and the consequent uncertainty about the reliability of this instrument of colonial rule.
[16] The most sweeping suggestion was made by Resident Superior Robin who wanted to "completely and radically abolish all regiments of Tirailleurs tonkinois in the service in the delta and the middle regions" and relieve them with "white [Foreign] Legion or even North African Battalions".
[19] Prior to the mutiny, the Department of War had clearly indicated that it would not be able "to provide for one more European Battalion in Indochina in the 1931 Budget" due to fiscal constraints, manpower shortages and organizational problems.
