In public choice theory, tax choice (sometimes called taxpayer sovereignty,[1] earmarking, participatory taxation or fiscal subsidiarity[2][failed verification]) is an emerging type of citizen sourcing in which individuals or groups of taxpayers decide how to allocate part of their taxes of a municipal or public budget appropriation through a process of democratic deliberation and decision-making.
Proponents of tax sovereignty believe that in such a relationship, the taxpayer endows power to the state to ensure the satisfaction of the public interest.
Alan T. Peacock, in his 1961 book The Welfare Society,[page needed] advocates greater diversity in public services (education, housing, hospitals).
[clarification needed] According to Vincent and Elinor Ostrom, it is possible that government may oversupply, and a market arrangement may undersupply, those public goods for which exclusion is not feasible.
Wallace E. Oates wrote: "In the Tiebout model, for example, there is costless mobility; individuals seek out a jurisdiction that provides exactly the level of output of the public good that they wish to consume.
He wrote: "One possible approach to development aid would be to apply effectively what is known as fiscal subsidiarity, allowing citizens to decide how to allocate a portion of the taxes they pay to the State.
The plot of the short story involves a man offered the choice to participate in allocating his taxes with the assistance of Artificial intelligence.
[20] In cases of individuals not belonging to a registered religious group or secular humanist organization, the amount that would otherwise be used for the sóknargjald remains now part of the income tax budget.
Italian taxpayers devolve a compulsory 8 ‰ = 0.8% (eight per mil, i.e. eight per thousand) from their annual income tax return to an organised religion recognised by Italy or, alternatively, to a state-run social assistance scheme.