These poems maintained that virtues such as judgment, moderation, restraint, justice, and reverence could not be taught, and that such inborn qualities were limited to a few, leaving the rest "shameless and arrogant".

[7] The author derided democracy, writing, "As for the constitution of the Athenians, I do not praise them for having chosen it, because in choosing it they have given the better of it to the vulgar people (poneroi) rather than to the good (chrestoi)."

The constitution established a system that assigned safe, salaried positions by random lot; but left the hazardous jobs, such as those of the generals and cavalry commanders, to election of "the best qualified.

The early costs to maintain the military had grown exponentially when the Athenians were countered by a Peloponnesian navy that threatened to cut off their food supply.

Additionally, the loss of public revenue from tribute-paying states that rebelled, and a reduction in the collection of custom duties due to a drop in trade because of the war, put severe stress on the Athenian coffers.

[3] The damage to the economy was intense enough to cause a reduction in the number of citizens with enough wealth to take on the fiscal burden of state, religious and military service.

Historian Donald Kagan calculates from ancient records that the special war taxes, religious services, and other fiscal demands legally required from the wealthy by the city state during a seven-year period (411–404 BC) was 2.5 talents.

By 411, and especially in the years since the Sicilian disaster, the unprecedented expense would already have been strongly felt, and it would not take much imagination for the propertied classes to see that there would be similar and even greater demands in the future.

By June 411 BC, the Athenian leaders at Samos informed their troops that they could no longer expect to receive payments or funds for supplies and other expenses.

[3] The ancient historian Xenophon reports that, by that winter, the generals in the Hellespont were forced to waste time that might have otherwise been spent on training or other duties soliciting donations.

[3] Causing further discontent was the fact that, by 415 BC many of the respected political figures from the nobility, such as Cimon, Pericles and Nicias, had been replaced by people of lower class, such as Cleon, Hyperbolus and the noble-born but disreputable Alcibiades.

[12] Alcibiades, ostensibly working for the Spartans at the time, encouraged the ideas developing among the oligarchs by claiming he could secure much needed funds for Athens from Persian satraps in western Anatolia, such as Tissaphernes (who was giving him protection) under the promise that the democracy would end.

[1] The ancient historian Thucydides notes that the ploy by Alcibiades worked, "for the Athenian soldiers at Samos perceived that he had influence with Tissaphernes," and sent envoys from their camp to speak to him.

"[13] Alcibiades apparently judged the more moderate mood of his guests and substituted the demand for an oligarchy with a request that the pure direct democracy in Athens no longer be retained.

Since the Athenians no longer had a naval monopoly in the Aegean and had lost large cities to the Peloponnesians, there was no reason for the Persians to try to use money in order to garner good relations.

Phrynichus rejected this reasoning, holding that none of that would come true, for none of the cities "will want to be enslaved with either an oligarchy or a democracy rather than to be free under whichever of these happens to exist [locally]."

They appointed an embassy under Peisander to go to Athens and to end the current democratic system to allow the return of Alcibiades and win over the support of Tissaphernes.

[3] Historian Donald Kagan holds that Thrasybulus and his supporters were not willing to abolish democracy completely, but were willing to curtail its powers temporarily in order to deal with the immediate emergency of possible annihilation by enemies of Athens.

"[3] Despite knowing Alcibiades' conditions for his return, Thrasybulus persuaded the Athenian forces at Samos to vote to grant him immunity, recall him to duty, and elect him general.

The ancient historian Thucydides records, "He brought Alcibiades back to Samos thinking that the only safety for Athens was if he could bring Tissaphernes [and the Persian fiscal support] away from the Peloponnesians and over to their side.

"[3] When news of the military defeat at Sicily reached Athens, the populace was sure that the Sicilians would press their advantage and send an invasion fleet to Attica.

In light of this perceived emergency, a board of elders was elected in 413 BC to secure funds and lumber (for ships and defences) and take measures to end the economic slump.

The coup at Athens went forward as planned, and "[o]n the fourteenth day of the Attic month of Thargelion, June 9, 411, ... the [conspirators] seized the reality of power.

According to W. G. Forest: [N]o one knows how many men took a positive part in promoting it (my guess would be nearer fifty than four hundred), mainly because I do not wish to limit responsibility to those who had official recognition under the new regime.

The moderates, led by Theramenes and Aristocrates, called for the replacement of the Four Hundred with a broader oligarchy of "the 5,000", which would include all citizens of zeugitai status or higher.

Under pressure, the extremist leaders opened peace negotiations with Sparta and began constructing a fortification in the harbor of Piraeus, which the moderates believed they planned to use to give Spartan armies access to Athens.